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ABSTRACT: While the Internet has changed dramatically since the
early 1990s, the legal regime governing the right to privacy online
and Internet speech is still steeped in a myth of the Internet user,
completely hidden from others, in total control of his online experi-
ence, and free to come and go as he pleases. This false image of the
"virtual self" has also contributed to an ethos of lawlessness, irre-
sponsibility, and radical individuation online, allowing the eviscer-
ation of online privacy and the proliferation of hate and harass-
ment.
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I argue that the myth of the online anonym is not only false as a
matter of technology, but also inaccurate - it does not reflect the
sociology of the Internet: who we are online, what we want, and
how we engage in Internet society. I argue that decreasing online
anonymity, the mediation of our online experiences through inter-
mediaries, and the involuntary nature of much of our online pres-
ence require us to reorient the way we think about the right to pri-
vacy and freedom of speech online.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a pervasive impression that the online world offers its
users unregulated and rapid communication among end users, un-
interrupted connections to distant audiences, and direct access to a
wealth of information with minimal transaction costs. It does this,
the story continues, for anonymous users with an almost mystical
or magical purity - a sends a photo directly to b titled x.jpg by click-
ing "send;" x writes a blog post immediately accessible to all users
by clicking "publish" on TypePad;1 and p updates q's Wikipedia
I TypePad is blogging software that allows bloggers to write and maintain their
blogs.
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page to say that q is gay by logging in as "mrqlSgay" and clicking
"edit."2
Yet this image of a free and anonymous online world (Figure 1)
is simply false. The Internet may put rapid communication and ac-
cess to a worldwide mass audience at the fingertips of anyone with
a cell phone, but it does so through private intermediaries who fil-
ter for us, highlight relevant search results, and provide the plat-
form for every online interaction (Figure 2). Our online selves are






Consider, for example, the process by which an email goes from
one computer to another. Most people think it looks like the simple,
binodal relationship pictured in the first part of Figure 1. One per-
son, designated av, where v refers to the "virtual" or digital nature
of the users and process, sends an email to his recipient bv. But in
2 Anyone can create a Wikipedia account and edit most posts. Providing an email
is optional. See Create an Account, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:UserLogin&type=signup&retur
nto=MainPage (last visited Mar. 3, 2013 4:15PM).
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reality, emails wind their way through a complex series of process-
es and servers, touching on mechanisms given to us for a price by
private companies. Figure 2 shows an already oversimplified jour-
ney: a logs on to the Internet via an Internet Service Provider, or
ISP, like TimeWarner Cable or AT&T, and uses an email client, like
Microsoft Outlook or Google's Gmail, to write an email. Upon click-
ing "send," that email is processed through the server associated
with a's email client and finds the nearest host in cyberspace. The
email travels through a series of hosts, each of which ask a Domain
Name System (DNS) Server to find out where to route the email
next. Perhaps after passing through a virus or spam filter, the email
is processed by the recipient email server, down to the email client,
where the email can be viewed once b logs on to his Internet via his
ISP. At each stage of this process, intermediaries learn more about
users, making complete anonymity a fantasy.
The myth of the anonymous Internet user is not only pervasive
- even among politicians who should know better 3 - but this mis-
taken image of the Internet user governing his virtual experience
pervades the law of the Internet. It is part of the zeitgeist of the me-
dium itself: the online world is somehow different, separate, apart,
ephemeral or just plain fake. This perception has caused us to per-
ceive volitional actions where participation in online life is anything
but voluntary. It has also encouraged us to elevate the importance
of online speech while devaluing the effect of online harassment.
3 See, e.g., Anthony Weiner Twitter Scandal: New Photos Emerge, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 6, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/06/anthony-weiner-
twitter-new-photos n 871817.html; Matthew Jaffe, Congressman Chris Lee Resigns
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There are "Kill a Jew Day" groups 4 and entire websites dedicated to
ranking classmates by attractiveness and asking the question, "Who
would you do?"5 It has allowed devastating cyberharassment of gay
and lesbian youth to push victims to suicide, 6 targeted women with
threats and hate and left us incapable of conceiving of the harm
wrought by online defamation against a victim and his community.
Online harassment and violence is very real, yet for some reason we
tend think of it as less serious than anything that happens in the
physical world.
7
4 Yaakov Lappin, 'Kill a Jew' Page on Facebook Sparks Furor, JERUSALEM POST (July 5,
2010), http://www.jpost.com/JewishWorld/JewishNews/Article.aspx?id=180456.
- NJ College Aims To Get 'Cyber-Bullying' Anonymous Website Shut Down,
CBSNEWYORK.COM (Apr. 8, 2011), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/04/08/nj-
college-aims-to-get-cyber-bullying-anonymous-website-shut-down/.
6 E.g., Emily Bazelon, Bullies Beware, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.slate.com/id/2252543/; Emily Friedman, Victim of Secret Dorm Sex Tape
Posts Facebook Goodbye, Jumps to His Death, ABC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/victim-secret-dorm-sex-tape-commits-
suicide/story?id=11758716. And that was not the first time. Tyler had complained to
university officials that his roommate was videotaping him, but nothing was done.
Jonathan Lemire et al., Rutgers' Tyler Clementi Complained of Video Voyeur Before Fatal
Fall, DAILY NEWS (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/nylocal
/2010/10/01/2010-10-01 he wanted roomie out rutgerssuicidescomplained of_
video voyeur-before-fatal-fal.html.
I This is the phenomenon that Mary Anne Franks calls "cyberspace idealism." See
Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224, 226 (2011) ("[Hiarms committed in cyberspace are often
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I argue that Internet users are not free and autonomous agents
of pure choice, but rather situated social selves limited by interme-
diaries and the needs of the modern social world. They are Durk-
heimian agents, not Rawlsian ones. They are, as Durkheim argued,
automatic participants in a social order that existed before them,
tailoring their behavior and reflecting the interdependence of all
things. They are not, as Internet users are roughly described in sev-
eral areas of Internet law today, kings of everything, yet masters of
nothing, bumping heads with other virtual selves like hydrogen
atoms randomly hoping for fusion.
There are wide-reaching implications of this reorientation of
perspective, from online privacy and the consequences of partial
disclosures to the applicability of the third party doctrine to the pro-
tections afforded Internet speech. For example, if Internet users are
truly voluntary agents of free choice, giving up their personal data
when they choose, it makes sense that those who assume the risks
of disclosure should lose the privacy interest in the matters dis-
closed. However, if participation in online life is constructively in-
voluntary, then the disclosures necessary to that life should not ex-
tinguish users' privacy rights. Similarly, if users are social actors in
an interdependent social world online, then libertarian free speech
law is a bad fit for the virtual world.
In this Article, I introduce a sociological description of today's
Internet user. I first show how the inaccurate assumption of the un-
2013]
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fettered online anonym has created a doctrine of near-boundless
Internet free speech and has done damage to online privacy. I then
challenge the assumption, replace it with a more accurate descrip-
tion, indebted to sociological theory, of the modern Internet user
and construct an alternative way of analyzing free speech and pri-
vacy online. I argue that decreasing online anonymity, the media-
tion of our online experiences through intermediaries, and the in-
voluntary nature of much of our online presence underscore the
need for a sociology-driven Internet speech and privacy jurispru-
dence, or one that reflects empirically observed behavior and ef-
fects.
In Part I, I describe the myth of the virtual self as a completely
autonomous anonym roaming through cyberspace. The Supreme
Court's Internet speech cases, several online privacy and disclosure
decisions, and the language of online libertarians8 make this vision
clear. Relying on philosophical and legal scholars of liberalism,
classical Republicanism, and American constitutionalism, I argue in
Part II that the conception of the virtual self, which that jurispru-
dence reflects is remarkably similar to Immanuel Kant's autono-
mous self9 and John Rawls's political conception of the person 1 in
8 1 use the term "online libertarian" to refer to those scholars, advocates, and activ-
ists who believe that the best Internet is the least regulated Internet, and should be
the home to as much unregulated speech as possible.
Kant's autonomous self is the foundation of his understanding of human behav-
ior and the core of his political theory. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lara Denis ed., Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., 2005)
(eBook for iPad version) [hereinafter KANT, GROUNDWORK]; IMMANUEL KANT,
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott ed., 2009).
10 While Rawls's A Theory of Justice based its political principles on the Kantian
conception of the person, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter
RAWLS, JUSTICE], Rawls responded to criticism of that position by divorcing his theo-
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that all are separate from their physical or embodied selves and au-
tonomous agents of free choice. I also describe the implications of
this vision for two areas of law - online speech and privacy - argu-
ing that the myth of the autonomous agent underlies most of our
modern First Amendment law and is doing violence to user privacy
online. 1
Given these difficulties, I use Part III to propose a more robust
and more accurate vision of the virtual self that is based on the so-
ciological theories of Emile Durkheim 12 and four descriptive socio-
logical claims of online life: (1) that most, if not all, of us have some
kind of virtual presence; (2) that our virtual selves are increasingly
public, i.e., not anonymous, selves; (3) that our virtual interactions
are mediated by private Internet intermediaries; and (4) that many
of us are online involuntarily to some extent. While most of these
statements are no longer controversial, I show how these elements
are absent from online free speech and privacy jurisprudence even
though they constitute the best description of our virtual presence
going forward. In Part IV, I show how a reorientation of the virtual
ries from its Kantian roots. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); Michael J.
Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (1994) (book review).
11 We have created near-absolute free speech jurisprudence in both the physical
and virtual worlds, putting teenagers at risk and forcing those of us who wish to
address cyberharassment to rely on arguments for a school's disciplinary authority
of cyberbullies. This was my argument in Hostile Educational Environments. Ari Ezra
Waldman, Hostile Educational Environments, 71 MD. L. REV. 705 (2012) (arguing that
the difference between single-incident cyberaggression and repeated cyberbullying
means that, under current law, the respective cyberattacker's free speech defenses to
a school's authority to punish them should be treated differently).
12 
See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 20 (W.D. Halls trans.,
1997) [hereinafter DURKHEIM, DoLl. See also DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF
RELIGIOUS LIFE (Carol Cosman trans., 2001) [hereinafter DURKHEiM, ELEMENTARY
FORMS].
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self would foster robust protection for online privacy and safety. 13
This model would protect everyone, including at-risk youth, wom-
en and other minorities from harassment, and protect the privacy of
all Internet users. In the end, I create a vision of the virtual self and
a proposal for an open, participatory online world that reflects so-
cial norms, virtue and community responsibility in a society that is
not separate from our physical world, but rather bound up with
who we are offline.
14
I. THE MYTH OF THE INTERNET USER:
ANONYMITY AND FREE CHOICE
Sitting in an Internet cafe, you could be an overweight and
lonely middle-aged man; but, once you access your online avatar,
you could be a svelte, popular young woman. You could be brave
where your physical self was meek or proud of your sexuality
where your physical self had to hide in the closet. When consider-
ing the problem of minors accessing lewd or sexual content online,
the Supreme Court took this potential for anonymity to heart, not-
ing that there is "no effective way" to determine a user's age. 15 Nor,
for that matter, could strangers accessing dating sites assure them-
13 Some scholars refer to "digital citizenship," or the ability to participate actively
and effectively in online life. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron and Helen Norton, Inter-
mediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U.
L. Rev. 1435 (2011) (discussing how certain policy considerations make sense not
merely for their positive consequences, but as an expression of our digital identity);
KAREN MOSSBERGER ET AL., DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP: THE INTERNET, SOCIETY AND
PARTICIPATION (2008).
14 Many of the theories and claims in this paper are the subjects of more in-depth
qualitative and quantitative studies for my doctoral dissertation. Those results will
be published in article form along the way or upon publication of the dissertation.
15 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 876 (1997).
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selves that their friendly digital interlocutors are really the young
men or women in the pictures just exchanged via email. The Inter-
net was supposed to be liberating, a technology that allowed you to
be whomever you desired, at any time.
Anonymity was only one part of this liberty. The Internet was
supposed to free the online self from the constraints of its physical
cousin not only by allowing a user to create a whole new person,
but also by eliminating the external constraints on the physical self's
access to content, i.e., publishers who censor speech and intermedi-
aries whose control of the media makes it expensive to join in. John
Perry Barlow 16 called it "a world where anyone, anywhere may ex-
press his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of be-
ing coerced into silence or conformity."
17
This rhetoric found its way into early legal scholarship about
speech on the Internet. Lauding the democratizing potential of what
was then called the "information superhighway," Eugene Volokh
believed that the Internet would empower end users since what
they read, said, and heard in the physical world was controlled by
intermediaries, like Bertelsmann, Rupert Murdoch, and the pub-
lisher of the New York Times.'8 On the Internet, content would go
"straight from the speaker to the listener," 19 and since financial and
16 Mr. Barlow, an essayist and former lyricist for the Grateful Dead, has been
called a "cyberlibertarian." See JACK GOLDSMITH AND TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE
INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 17 (2006).
17 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-
Final.html. See also Franks, supra note 7, at 235-36 (citing additional similar state-
ments from Mr. Barlow and arguing that Mr. Barlow's view is the foundation for
"cyberspace idealism," a utopian vision of the online world).
18 Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What it Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1834 (1995).
19 Id. at 1836.
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opportunistic barriers to entry into the online speech market would
be close to zero, anyone who wanted "a variety of topics or views
will easily be able to get them." 20 Kathleen Sullivan agreed. Since
the Internet was available at home to anyone who could afford a
computer and a connection, or to anyone who could rent a few
minutes of connectivity at a cybercaf6 or drive to the public library
to use it for free, there would be more speakers and more listeners,
and more things said and heard.21
Internet users were also supposed to be autonomous. Unlike a
radio station, a newspaper, or a cable station, each of which pro-
vides specific content at a specific hour to users who happen to be
listening, reading,22 or watching at the time, the Internet would not
"push" content. Rather, "Internet consumers pull information from
the net at their own volition." 23 And given the economic and tech-
nical factors that make Internet speech cheap and, therefore, abun-
dant, being able to choose content from an enormous and limitless
cache was to be a true consumer in the ideal marketplace of ideas.2
4
As we shall see, this ability to choose among possibilities is not only
central to the myth of the online end user, but also a foundational
element of online speech and privacy jurisprudence.
20 Id. at 1834.
21 Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1670 (1998).
22 Even newspapers provide content at specific times. In addition to those local
papers that used to print morning and evening issues, newspapers generally provide
content once per day, each morning.
23 Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1668.
24 Id. at 1669-70 (citing Volokh, supra note 18).
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The unique features of the Internet - instant communication,
abundance of content, and the autonomy of the user25 - inspired its
early enthusiasts to see the online world as a realization of a long-
sought goal of free speech law - the "marketplace of ideas." 26 That
"idealism," 27 to use Mary Ann Franks's word, has been reaffirmed
by the Supreme Court's online speech jurisprudence. In Ashcroft v.
American Civil Liberties Union,28 the Court hailed the Internet as a
"forum for a true diversity of political discourse."29 In Reno v. Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union,30 the Court marveled that the Internet ena-
bled "any person with a phone line" to become a "pamphleteer" or
a "town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from
any soapbox." 31 At any given time, the Court said, Internet users
could freely access content on their own, without being forced to
consume any of it.32 Internet communications, the Court noted, "do
15 Id. at 1667-69. Professor Sullivan also refers to the "unboundedness" of the In-
ternet. While this has come to refer to the incorrect view that the cross-boundary
nature of data means that content regulation is not possible for individual nations-
consider the examples of Chinese censorship and Egypt shutting down the Internet
during the 2011 Arab Spring -Professor Sullivan was simply referring to the ability
of Internet users to reach international audiences, sometimes involuntarily.
26 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[Tihe ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas.., the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.").
27 Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 7, at 226, 235-36. This "idealism" did not
go unopposed. See, e.g., Jerry Berman and Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User
Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive
Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1628-29,1636-37 (1995).
a 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
29 Id. at 566.
- 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
31 Id. at 870.
32 Id. at 852 (citing Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D.
Pa. 1996)) ("content on the Internet... as diverse as human thought").
2013]
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not 'invade' an individual's home or appear on one's computer
screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content 'by accident.'
' 33
This distinguished the Internet from, say, a radio station or a televi-
sion broadcast, which could use its scheduled content to penetrate
the home with images unsuitable for children. An online user
would have to click on a sex-themed webpage and pass through its
pop-up warning for images to come up, but if a prime time cable
host used a curse word or if an evening drama showed its star in
some state of undress, that content was pushed onto consumers
involuntarily.
In the privacy context, the ideal of the freely choosing self mani-
fests itself when the assumption of risk doctrine justifies the extin-
guishment of a continued privacy interest after an initial disclosure.
A telephone user, for example, "voluntarily convey[s] numerical
information to the telephone company.. . [and] assume[s] the risk"
that the telephone company would subsequently reveal that infor-
mation.34 A bank depositor has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in the financial information "voluntarily conveyed to . . . banks"
because the depositor "takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to an-
other, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government." 35 This doctrine has been extended to the Internet.
Several federal courts have held that since any information con-
veyed to an online service provider in order to access the Internet is
"knowingly revealed," there could be no invasion of privacy when
an Internet service provider ("ISP") gives that information to some-
33 Id. at 869 (citing Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844).
34 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
3- United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
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one else. 36 Similarly, in United States v. Forrester,37 the Ninth Circuit
refused to recognize any legitimate expectation of privacy in the
to/from addresses of email messages or the Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses of the websites we visit because "this information is
"voluntarily" turned over to ISPs. 38 As Justice Marshall noted in his
dissent in Smith v. Maryland,39 the foundation of the assumption of
risk doctrine is the online anonym's power of free choice, where he
exercises some volition or "discretion" in deciding on a course of
action.
40
Putting this together, the early image of the Internet user was as
an anonymous and autonomous self, one who was free from the
constraints imposed by his own body, media intermediaries and
censors, and one who freely and voluntarily governed his own user
experience. And he was both the same as every other Internet user -
everyone was supposedly anonymous and free and could access the
same content if he so chose - and different: since the Internet could
be accessed in Springfield, Paris and Ulan Batur, it necessarily con-
stituted a pluralistic society of users. This online anonym was a free
figure, hidden from everyone else, learning from and contributing
to a pluralistic community of man.
I argue that the so-called myth of the virtual self - detached
from, blind to, and unconstrained by his physical self and the phys-
36 United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999). See also
United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) ("When defendant
entered into an agreement with Road Runner for Internet service, he knowingly
revealed all information connected to [his] IP address .... He cannot now claim to
have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his subscriber information.").
37 512 F.3d 500th (9th Cir. 2008).
M Id. at 510.
39 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
40 Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ical world in which he lives - is at the heart of our current Internet
speech and privacy jurisprudence even though the image was never
accurate, internally inconsistent, and, in any event, outdated. It has
contributed to an online speech doctrine that endangers gay and
lesbian teenagers, women,41 and other victimized minorities, and
stacks the deck against the protection of user privacy online.
The American philosopher John Rawls created a strikingly simi-
lar ideal self, indebted to Immanuel Kant, and a political conception
of the self, to defend the modern liberal state and its organizing
principles of liberty, tolerance, and pluralism. His ideal self, anon-
ymous to everyone else behind the "veil of ignorance" and an au-
tonomous agent of choice, was not weighed down by prejudice,
limitations, and other encumbrances. It was the self we should be
when we craft organizing principles for society. Rawls could not
have known it, but the early image of the Internet user captured
Rawls's vision,42 and, to some extent, Internet society mirrors the
world according to Rawls's self.
41 Danielle Citron's work focuses on the victimization of women online. See, e.g.,
Danielle Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009).
42 Others have compared the mythological virtual self to the writings on freedom
and liberty of John Locke. See Franks, supra note 7, at 234-37. Professor Franks com-
pares the "rhetoric of cyberspace idealism," i.e., the unfettered freedom of the Inter-
net user, to Locke's ideal of freedom in the state of nature. Id. at 234. That argument
is persuasive, and consistent with my own. I compare the so-called ideal virtual self,
the anonym taking advantage of the freedom Professor Franks discusses, to the au-
tonomous self of the Kantian/Rawlsian tradition. All liberals in the classical sense,
Locke, Kant and Rawls were part of the same project to elevate the individual over
its ends. See JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690).
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I. KANT, RAWLS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FREE SPEECH AND
PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE
Immanuel Kant and neo-Kantians 3 like John Rawls are not the
only philosophers of liberalism whose ideas have shaped American
law,44 but their theories have become the core of a modem state that
prioritizes individual rights and sees its members as free agents of
choice. They have also become the basis for modern free speech and
privacy jurisprudence, both in the physical world and online: they
envision a duality of the self where autonomy and choice are central
to the democratic idea.
A. THE LIBERAL SELF AND THE MYTH OF THE ONLINE ANONYM
The Kantian scholar Christine Korsgaard reminds us that Kant
constructs two separate worlds, one in which man is free, one in
which he is not.45 In the real world we are not free. We, like animals,
are governed by external forces; we can neither completely control
our need to eat nor master our desire to have sex. 46 This is what
Kant calls our "heteronomous actions," our actions in the physical
43 Notably, Durkheim should also be considered a neo-Kantian. See, e.g.,
ANTHONY GIDDENS, EMILE DURKHEIM 91 (1979) (referring to certain of Durkheim's
writings as "sociological Kantianism").
44 Rogers Smith and many others would point to Locke as the primary liberal
voice that influenced the Framers. ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, 18-29 (1990).
45 KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 9, at 190; KANT,
GROUNDWORK, supra note 9, at 27-28. For my analysis of Kant's view of the self, I
rely primarily on the work of Christine Korsgaard, Thomas Scanlon, John Rawls and
Michael Sandel.
46 Christine Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals,
The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, 5, 12 (Feb. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/-korsgaar/ CMK.FellowCreatures.pdf.
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world.47 Every step we take in the physical world is based on the
desire to achieve something that we want or need. Freedom, there-
fore, is contingent upon deposing our wants and desires from their
mastery over us. To do this, we must detach ourselves from the
physical world. Here we can begin to see a parallel to the myth of
the virtual self. In Kant's morality, only when we step away into a
purely intelligible world can we be free.48 Autonomy, in contrast to
heteronomy, is independence from "the determining causes of the
world of sense."49 But since our actions in the real world are gov-
erned entirely by wants and desires, our autonomous selves only
exist in the intelligible world, prior to those inclinations taking hold
over us. "If we think of ourselves as free," Kant writes, "we
transport ourselves" outside of the real world and recognize "the
autonomy of the will." 50 This detachment is necessary to freely
choose among ends because any choice we make in the physical
world is governed by wants and desires and, thus, never truly free.
For Kant, then, autonomy and choice are salient. In Kant's
world, the free individual is primary and controls his destiny. Free-
dom derives from stepping outside the physical world, breaking
loose from the constraints imposed by our bodies, our wants and
our needs, and entering a world governed by pure reason, where
we can decide what we want on our own terms. This vision of the
rational self sounds strikingly similar to the myth of the virtual self
described by Eugene Volokh, John Perry Barlow and the courts in
Reno, Zeran, and Forrester, among others. Both the rational self and
the early image of the virtual self find liberation in shedding physi-
47 KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 10, at 51.
48Id. at 71.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 72.
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cal constraints, both are free agents of choice in control of their des-
tiny, and both inhabit an ideal world.
Rawls's conception of the self is also free and independent, not
limited by the physical, emotional and moral constraints of his
physical life, and exercising his freedom by choosing his goals from
among a myriad of possibilities. In Political Liberalism, Rawls argued
that neo-Kantian detachment is necessary only for political purpos-
es, not as any universal source of just behavior. He felt that we need
to detach ourselves from our wants, desires, and prejudices in order
to think about questions of political justice. Should picketing be
banned near a school?5 1 Should we force people to take loyalty
oaths before they can get a benefit from the state?52 Privately, there
may be commitments so important that there would be no way that
we "could or should . .. stand apart from [them] and evaluate ob-
jectively .... It [would be] simply unthinkable to view [our]selves
apart from certain religious, philosophical, and moral convictions."
53 But when we turn from our private lives to the public sphere,
those ties, however strong, have to be left at home, lest we use our
antecedent moral prejudices to infringe on the rights of others. For
example, when deciding if all types of picketing except school-
related labor picketing should be banned near a school, we should
bracket our personal opinions concerning unpopular views and ask
ourselves if it is appropriate for the state to accept some types of
5' Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
52 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (holding that withholding tax exemptions
because of failure to take a loyalty oath violated the First Amendment).
53 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 11, at 31.
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protest, but not others.54 And when determining the constitutionali-
ty of conditioning rights on taking a loyalty oath, we should bracket
our love of country and consider whether we want our rights condi-
tioned on the State forcing us to speak against our better judg-
ment.
55
The Rawlsian self exists in a society assumed to be plural, or
constitutive of different people. Otherwise, there would be no need
for principles of justice, which "deal with conflicting claims upon
the advantages won by social co-operation; they apply to the rela-
tions among several persons or groups."56 Conflicts arise because
we are different; we each possess a unique cacophony of wants, de-
sires, hopes and dreams. This leads to a host of political and legal
implications for the modem liberal state - most notably, neutrality
among the diverse interests of its citizens.
Rawls's political conception of the person, therefore, still con-
structs a duality in the self: we are private selves and public selves.
In private, the self is properly encumbered and influenced by those
people and commitments around him; but when considering politi-
cal questions in public, he should leave his prejudices behind. So,
54 In Mosley, the Court wrote that "above all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content." Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96.
55 In his concurring opinion in Speiser's companion case, Justice Black stated that
"[1]oyalty oaths, as well as other contemporary 'security measures,' tend to stifle all
forms of unorthodox or unpopular thinking or expression - the kind of thought and
expression which has played such a vital and beneficial role in the history of this
Nation. The result is a stultifying conformity which in the end may well turn out to
be more destructive to our free society than foreign agents could ever hope to be."
First Unitarian Church of L.A. v. Cnty. of L.A., 357 U.S 513, 532 (Black, J., concur-
ring).
56 RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 16.
Durkheim's Internet
the Kantian self - autonomous from and unconstrained by his ends
- lives on the liberal public sphere Rawls creates.
This vision is just as liberating as - and strikingly similar to -
the myth of online anonym and the so-called "ideal" virtual world
he inhabits. In the modern liberal state, Rawls wants us to exist as
two people: one is complete with all the good and bad personality
traits that come with wanting things, loving things, and hating
things; the other is free from the constraints of the physical world,
free to choose his way in life, and free to remain neutral to the
choices of others. Similarly, the image of the online anonym envi-
sions two selves: one is limited by his body and identity in the real
world; the other is unconstrained by physical, geographic and iden-
tifying limitations in the virtual world. Both the political sphere and
the virtual world were supposed to be bastions of freedom, where
we could shed whatever held us back and freely exercise our au-
tonomy.
The Rawlsian self, defined by his autonomy and ability to
choose, also describes much about modern free speech and privacy
law, both in the physical world and online. Unfortunately, the pri-
macy of the autonomous choosing self unencumbered by society
has contributed to a First Amendment lawlessness and the eviscera-
tion of privacy rights.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR SPEECH AND PRIVACY: FREE CHOICE AND
NEUTRALITY
There are two salient and related implications of this vision of
the person. First, his power to choose is central to who he is, an ar-
gument made persuasively by Professor Korsgaard: "when Kant
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says rational nature or humanity is an end in itself, it is the power
of rational choice that he is referring to, and in particular, the power
to set an end ... and pursue it by rational means." 57 What defines
us, then, is our capacity to choose: "a moral person is a subject with
ends he has chosen, and his fundamental preference is for conditions
that enable him to frame a mode of life that expresses his nature as
a free and equal rational being as fully as circumstances permit."
58
In Professor Sandel's words, the Kantian (and neo-Kantian) self is
"a sovereign agent of choice." 59
If the power to choose is central to the self, then any society that
he would create in the original position would respect his right to
make his own choices, whatever they might be. Rawls was not
alone in coming to this neo-Kantian conclusion. Thomas Scanlon
would later describe a society based on the Kantian self in a similar
way:
The "basic structure" of society is its legal, political, and
economic framework .... If a basic structure does this in an
acceptable way - if citizens have no reasonable complaint
about their access to various positions within this frame-
work or to the package of rights, liberties, and opportuni-
ties for economic reward that particular positions present
them with - then that structure is just. It is up to individu-
als, operating within this framework, to choose their own
ends and make use of the given opportunities and re-
sources to pursue those ends as best they can. How success-
57 
CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 124 (1996) [hereinafter
KORSGAARD, ENDS].
58 RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 561 (emphasis added).
59 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITs OF JUSTICE 22 (1998).
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ful or unsuccessful, happy or unhappy they are as a result
is their own responsibility. 6°
By extension, then, it is also up to the individual to live with the
consequences of the choices he makes. As we shall see, much mod-
ern privacy law assumes that the individual is a free and voluntary
agent of choice, despite the fact that in many cases of partial disclo-
sures he is nothing of the sort.
The next important implication of the individuated, autono-
mous self choosing his ends is, as Professor Scanlon notes, that the
state must be neutral in the moral controversies of its members. In
other words, if the most important thing about us is our ability and
right to choose our own path, the state should not step in to tell us
that one goal is better than the other, that this job is better for us
than any other, or that this speech is worth more than any other
speech. This implication of the Kantian and Rawlsian selves defines
the character of online speech jurisprudence. It is "precisely because
we are freely choosing, independent selves," Rawls states, "that we
need a neutral framework, a framework of rights that refuses to
choose among competing values and ends," 61 or, more specifically,
refuses to choose for us among the myriad of possibilities from
which we are supposed to choose. After all, what matters in the
Rawlsian ethic is not what ends we choose, but our ability to choose
our ends independent of some exogenous, comprehensive dogma.
Neutrality, therefore, means that the government should not af-
firm any particular vision of the good life, or, to use the common
parlance, stay out of the moral debates of its citizens. Thus, the state
60 THOMAS M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 244 (1998).
61 MICHAEl J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICAN IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 12 (1996) [hereinafter SANDEL, DISCONTENT].
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should not establish an official religion. 62 Nor should the state crim-
inalize abortion 63 or the possession or distribution of sex toys
64
simply because church teachings forbid it. When thinking about
these questions in the liberal state, we must bracket away the parts
of our lives mediated by tradition, social networks, and social
norms. If these implications of the vision of the individuated, au-
tonomous self extend to the virtual world, we must come to the
same conclusion - namely, that the restrictions of the physical
world are meaningless online. The state should foster free choice
and remain neutral toward our online journey.
62 See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 347 U.S. 203, 243 (1963) (" [In
order to give effect to the First Amendment's purpose of requiring on the part of all
organs of government a strict neutrality toward theological questions, courts should
not undertake to decide such questions [regarding theological disputes]. These prin-
ciples were first expounded in the case of Watson v. Jones, which declared that judi-
cial intervention in such a controversy would open up 'the whole subject of the doc-
trinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organi-
zation of every religious denomination.' Courts above all must be neutral, for '(t)he
law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establish-
ment of no sect."' (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
63 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) ("We need not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judici-
ary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer.").
64 See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2008) ("The
State's primary justifications for the statute are 'morality based.' The asserted inter-
ests include 'discouraging prurient interests in autonomous sex and the pursuit of
sexual gratification unrelated to procreation and prohibiting the commercial sale of
sex.' These interests in 'public morality' cannot constitutionally sustain the statute
after Lawrence.").
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C. CHOICE AND NEUTRALITY IN MODERN FREE SPEECH AND
PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE
I have argued that the liberal self - as described by Kant's met-
aphysics and Rawls's political conception of the person - is striking-
ly similar to the myth of the online anonym, who apparently enjoys
unlimited freedom in the virtual world. The similarity is important
because the assumption of free choice and the requirement of state
neutrality are necessary implications of both the Kantian and
Rawlsian conceptions of the self and the online anonym. In this sec-
tion, I will use certain areas of speech and privacy law as case stud-
ies to prove how far the liberal selves and myth of the online ano-
nym have penetrated modem law.
In the speech context, we have come to assume that the Consti-
tution sets up a roughly neutral framework of rights that frowns on
viewpoint- or content-based restrictions on speech. But our respect
for neutrality has turned the Internet into a place of lawlessness,
where the dangers of unbridled speech rights are ignored. In the
privacy context, the third party doctrine and the common law prin-
ciple of assumption of risk ignore both logic and the sociology of
Internet users, and thereby limit privacy rights on the assumption
that those users are free and voluntary agents of choice.
1. Neutrality in Offline and Online Free Speech Law
If he were alive today, Rawls would see much of his work re-
flected in the modern Supreme Court's free speech precedents. The
Court has gone out of its way to divorce the First Amendment from
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any particular conception of the good, and instead sees the ban on
laws abridging the freedom of speech 65 as setting up a neutral
framework where most people can speak freely, subject to relatively
few restrictions and exceptions.
66
65 "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST.,
amend. I.
66 See RAWIs, JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 203. It was not always that way. The Fram-
ers never conceived of the First Amendment as a unique expression of individual
rights, but rather merely as a check on federal power and a guarantor of citizen par-
ticipation. Thomas Jefferson would have been fine with the Sedition Act of 1798, for
example, if it had come from the States; the authority to address an "overwhelming
torrent of slander which is confounding all vice and virtue," he wrote to Abigail
Adams, "is fully possessed by the several state legislatures .... While we deny that
Congress have a right to controul the freedom of the press, we have ever asserted the
right of the states, and their exclusive right to do so." LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE
OF A FREE PRESS 307 (1985) (quoting Jefferson to Abigail Adams, Sept. 4, 1804). And
most legal historians believe that the Framers took a decidedly republican perspec-
tive on the First Amendment, focused mainly on the telos of free expression to an
effective democracy. See, e.g., id. Justice Brandeis made this point in his concurrence
in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), where a unanimous Court upheld the
conviction of a man who tried to establish a communist party, stating that "that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of American government." Id.
at 375. Notably, Justice Brandeis may have been more influenced by classical philos-
ophy than the words of the Framers. See Pnina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian
and Republican Justifications for Free Speech, 4 J.L. & POL. 451, 461-64 (1988). For
Brandeis, the purpose of the First Amendment was to ensure that the citizenry could
fulfill its responsibility to engage in active public discussion about political matters, a
view the Framers embraced. Justice John Marshall agreed, believing that the danger
to the public peace of "calumnious" speech was reason enough to suppress it be-
cause defamation that would "at length sully the fairest reputation, and will throw
suspicion on the purest conduct," would cause wrought destruction of the public
sphere or cause citizens to shy away from it. John Marshall, Address of the Minority
11-14 (1839) (quoted in ROBERT KENNETH FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN
MARSHALL 88, n. 61 (1968)). Rogers Smith reminds us that James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson saw individual liberties in context, there for the purpose of pro-
moting "'moderation and harmony' and hence 'the preservation of free govern-
ment.'" SMITH, supra note 44, at 94. And Alexander Hamilton, in arguing for ratifica-
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Content-neutrality refers to the doctrine that when a law re-
stricts some element of speech, the Court's role is not to get in-
volved in the particular moral dispute over the speech being re-
stricted, but to simply decide whether the state actor treated every-
one the same. It is a necessary implication of the Kantian and
Rawlsian selves: To protect the individual's right as an autonomous
agent of choice, the state must respect those choices. Otherwise, if
the government commanded that labor protests are permissible, but
denied citizens a right to protest a woman's right to choose to have
an abortion, for example, it would be enforcing one particular vi-
sion of the good, while restricting individual autonomy.
Content-neutrality may owe its longevity to Rawls, but it owes
its birth to Oliver Wendell Holmes. In Otis v. Parker,67 a non-speech
case, Justice Holmes spoke eloquently about the Constitution's neu-
trality, noting that "[c]onsiderable latitude must be allowed for dif-
ferences of view.... Otherwise a constitution, instead of embody-
ing only relatively fundamental rules of right.., would become the
partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions." 68 Both
the Constitution and the judge interpreting it were neutral among
ends: "it by no means is true that every law is void which may seem
to the judges who pass upon it excessive, unsuited to its ostensible
end, or based upon conceptions of morality with which they disa-
tion of the Constitution in The Federalist No. 1, cautioned about too much concern
about the individual, for zeal for individual rights is "a much more certain road to
the introduction of despotism" than a "zeal for the firmness and efficiency of gov-
ernment." THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 4 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Wills ed., 1982).
For these early American leaders, the right to speak freely did not reside in the self
qua self, but rather in the ends of society, fostering civic goals of participation, educa-
tion and order.
67187 U.S. 606 (1903).
68 Id. at 609.
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gree." 69 And in Lochner v. New York, 70 Holmes stated that he would
uphold the maximum hour law for bakers regardless of his personal
views because they had nothing "to do with the right of a majority
to embody their opinions in law" 71 and because the Constitution
does not impose any particular economic truth on society. 72 With
that, Holmes typified what Rawls meant by his "political concep-
tion of the person" or the self in the original position. When consid-
ering questions of politics and justice, Holmes requires that we
bracket away our private morality. Holmes saw that detachment as
both a good ideaand required by the neutrality embodied in the
Constitution.
With respect to free speech, this neutrality means that the First
Amendment requires government to act as a neutral arbitrator in
the marketplace of ideas, neither distorting the citizenry's discus-
sion of important issues nor favoring certain viewpoints or forms of
expression. 73 In Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley 74 and Carey v.
69 Id. at 608.
7 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
71 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
73 This view is widely held. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: In-
cidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 932-33, 939,
945 (1993) (arguing that the First Amendment's core is that the government should
not make policy based on the effects of speech); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public
Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 413, 414 (1996) ("First Amendment law ... has as its primary, though unstated,
object the discovery of improper governmental motives."); Jed Rubenfeld, The First
Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 769 (2000) (arguing that free speech cases
ask one thing: whether the government acted with an impermissible anti-speech
motive); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 197-233 (1983) (suggesting, in part, that the content neutrality
principle is based on the desire for equality among speakers).
- 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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Brown,75 for example, the Court invalidated laws that banned pick-
eting near a school and home, respectively, but exempted labor pro-
tests. The Court held that the "central problem" with the bans was
"that it describe[d] the permissible picketing in terms of its subject
matter." After all, "the essence of ... forbidden censorship is con-
tent control." 76 The bans "accord[ed] preferential treatment to the
expression of views on one particular subject," as if the government
was deciding for its citizens what kind of protest speech was better
than others. The statutes endorsed particular concepts of the good -
labor protests are "better" than any other protests - and ignored the
individual's fundamental right to discern for himself what kind of
protests to join.
It should be evident that the neo-Kantian vision of the self as an
autonomous agent of choice has informed our First Amendment
jurisprudence in its rhetorical and substantive respect for the au-
tonomy of the speaker above all else and in its requirement of con-
tent-neutral laws. Those principles also form the foundation of our
current laws governing Internet intermediary liability for third par-
ty speech and the Supreme Court's Internet speech jurisprudence,
suggesting that the same vision of the autonomous self also influ-
ences the Court's treatment of speech in the virtual world.
Section 230(c)(1) 77 of the Communications Decency Act
("CDA") 78 is probably the starkest example of free speech neutrality
- 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
76 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
7 Section 230(c)(1) states that "no provider or user of an interactive computer ser-
vice shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by an-
other information content provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). The term "interac-
tive computer service" means "any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet
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online. The legislative history of the provision, which immunizes
from suit certain service providers for the acts of third parties
online, suggests that it was included to promote online libertarian
purposes. Section 230 was first offered as an amendment by Repre-
sentatives Christopher Cox of California and now-Senator Ron Wy-
den of Oregon 79 to make sure that Internet providers were not
treated "like other information providers such as newspapers, mag-
azines, or television and radio stations," who, at common law and
by statute, "may be held liable for publishing or distributing ob-
scene or defamatory material written or prepared by others." 80
Therefore, the section's goal was to override traditional liability
rules applicable to nearly every other information service provider,
leaving the Internet a unique locus of unfettered speech. Indeed,
Congress explicitly stated that it made this policy choice to preserve
the Internet as "a forum for a true diversity" of views "with a min-
and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institu-
tions." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2006). "Most courts have held that through these provi-
sions, Congress granted interactive services of all types, including blogs, forums, and
listservs, immunity from tort liability so long as the information is provided by a
third party." Citizen Media Law Project, Immunity for Online Publishers Under the
Communications Decency Act, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/immunity-online-
publishers-under-communications-decency-act.
78 The CDA is Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 133 (1996) (codified as amended in various sections of 47 U.S.C.).
79 See 141 CONG. REC. H8460-01 (Aug. 4,1995).
80 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D. D.C. 1998). Some commentators
have suggested that Congress intended for § 230(c) to override only publisher, not
distributor, liability. See, e.g., Susan Friewald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in
Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569,
637-42 (2001) (courts should leave distributor liability intact when applying § 230);
David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REv. 147, 167-72
(1997) ("[W]hen Congress said 'publisher,' it meant 'publisher,' and not 'distribu-
tor.'").
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imum of government regulation," and to maintain "the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet ... un-
fettered by Federal or State regulation." 81 That means that Congress
thought the Internet was different than traditional media, and that
the Internet user was somehow unique or different from users of
traditional media. What made the virtual world a bastion of liber-
tarian free speech philosophy, then, was the conception of the vir-
tual self as anonymous, autonomous, and distinct from his physical
self.
Congress's other reason for enacting § 230(c) was to encourage
Internet intermediaries, users and parents to self-police the Internet
for obscene conduct.8 2 But in interpreting the clause, courts have
tended to minimize Congress's hope for digital virtue. In Zeran v.
America Online, Inc.,83 for example, the Fourth Circuit focused al-
most exclusively on § 230's concern that lawsuits against providers
for third party content would risk "freedom of speech in the new
and burgeoning Internet medium." 84 Concluding that AOL was
immune from suit for offensive messages about the Oklahoma City
bombing on an AOL bulletin board, 85 the court stated that "Section
230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet
communication, and accordingly, to keep government interference
in the medium to a minimum."8 6 While the court gave lip service to
Congress's hope that the provision would encourage self-help, it
81 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)(3)-(4), (b)(2).
82 See § 230(b)(4); 141 Cong. Rec. H8469-70 (Statements of Representative Cox,
Wyden and Barton); Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52.
83 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
8Id. at 330.
15 Id. at 3
2
8.
8 Id. at 330. See also Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980,
985 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000).
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never entered into the Fourth Circuit's broad reading of the
clause.
87
Implicit in § 230 and its legislative history is a respect for au-
tonomy and neutrality. By distinguishing online providers from
offline providers, which have been subject to limitations because of
the scarcity of radio signals88 and the invasiveness of and easy ac-
87 It makes sense that the online libertarian purpose would be given primacy over
any other stated purpose because regardless of the legislative history of the entire
CDA and any congressman's statement otherwise, Congress made clear that it in-
cluded § 230 to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services. 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). In that case, a user of Prodigy's "Money Talk" bulletin board
posted that Stratton Oakmont, an investment bank, committed fraud and other crim-
inal acts before its initial public offering. Id. at *1. Stratton sued Prodigy, arguing that
by running the bulletin board and holding itself out as a service that monitored and
removed such content, Prodigy should be liable for the defamation. Id. at *1-'2. The
court agreed. Because Prodigy took an active role in monitoring its bulletin boards, it
was a publisher for the purposes of state libel laws and could be held liable for de-
famatory posts. Id. at *4. When it took up § 230, Congress made clear that it wanted
to use the section to overrule Stratton Oakmont. See S. REP. No. 104-230, at 194 (1996)
("One of the specific purposes of [Section 230] is to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prod-
igy and any other similar decisions .... "); H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf.
Rep.) ("The conferees believe that [decisions such as Stratton Oakmont] create serious
obstacles to the important federal policy of empowering parents to determine the
content of communications their children receive through interactive computer ser-
vices."); 141 Cong. Rec. at H8461-70 (statement of Rep. Cox) (referring to disincen-
tives created by the Stratton Oakmont decision). See also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (em-
phasizing that § 230 was adopted to overrule Stratton Oakmont); HARVEY L.
ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATION LAw 615 (1999) (observing that it is
"crystal clear that [Section 230 was] designed to change the result in future cases like
Stratton Oakmont"). As a defamation case unrelated to obscenity or minors, Stratton
Oakmont played a defining role in the creation and passage of § 230, suggesting that
Congress's chief concern was maintaining an Internet free speech regime that was as
unfettered as possible.
8 NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943) ("[Radio] facilities are lim-
ited; they are not available to all who may wish to use them; the radio spectrum
simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody. There is a fixed natural limi-
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cess to television,8 9 Congress absolved itself and the judiciary from
having to determine the role of the provider in the virtual world
and presumed that the online self autonomously chooses content
and is never confronted with speech that he did not select on his
own. In other words, it does not matter what role TimeWarner Ca-
ble, Google, Facebook, or YouTube play in providing and organiz-
ing content because, under § 230, they are treated like faceless vir-
tual persons roaming the Internet's Wild West alongside the auton-
omous virtual self.
These same presumptions about the virtual self were also pre-
sent in the Supreme Court's major Internet speech cases. In Reno v.
ACLU,90 the Court struck down the other part of the CDA, which
prohibited the online transmission and display of indecent speech
directed at minors. The CDA, which at least some members of Con-
gress seemed to think was unconstitutional when they voted for it,9 1
was vague and overbroad. 92 Beyond that specific holding, the
Court's vision of the virtual self reflected the influence of Kant and
Rawls. For the Reno Court, the virtual self was an active agent of
tation upon the number of stations that can operate without interfering with one
another."); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-401 (1969).
89 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (stating first that "the broad-
cast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Ameri-
cans" with the ability to "confront[] the citizen" at home, and second, that "broad-
casting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read").
- 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
91 See 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (the Cox-Wyden amendment sought to provide aid
during the "flood of legal challenges" likely to prevent the rest of the Act from hav-
ing any effect). See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 174
(1999) (referring to the CDA as a whole as "[a] law of extraordinary stupidity [that]
practically impaled itself on the First Amendment").
92 Reno, 521 U.S. at 870-73, 877.
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choice 93 - he had to verify his age with a credit card number or an
adult password, suggesting that he was hardly a passive person
with content thrust upon him. "[Ulsers seldom encounter[ed] such
content by accident," the Court reasoned, noting that an Internet
user would receive detailed information about a site's content be-
fore taking the next step and accessing the file. And indecent con-
tent was hidden by warnings as to the sexual content, making "the
odds . . . slim" that someone would access explicit sites by acci-
dent. 94 This description presumes a virtual self in complete com-
mand of his online activity; it ignores pop-up windows, sexually
explicit sites with strange names and teaser content before requiring
payment, and search engines that aggregate and arrange content
without the user's input. But while this vision of the virtual self is,
at best, incomplete - and not entirely unsurprising coming from a
group of relatively elderly judges who received one Internet tutorial
during Reno's pendency 95 - it pervades the Court's decision. If the
virtual self were not an agent of choice who controls his online con-
duct, the Internet could be accurately compared to television broad-
casters who "push" their content into the home. Yet the myth of the
autonomous online self gave the Court a way to distinguish its pre-
vious media intermediary jurisprudence.
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, the legal frame-
work expressed by § 230, Zeran, and Reno is influenced by the per-
9a Id. at 864, 870.
94 Id. at 854.
95 Tony Mauro, The Hidden Power Behind the Supreme Court: Justices Give Pivotal Role
to Novice Lawyers, USA TODAY (Mar. 13, 1998), 1A ("The court's library arranged for a
demonstration of the Internet, and several clerks gave their justices short tutorials on
how to navigate.") (quoted in Mark S. Kende, Regulating Internet Pornography Aimed
at Children: A Comparative Constitutional Perspective on Passing the Camel Through the
Needle's Eye, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1623, 1631 n.54 (2007)).
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ception of the autonomous self and its attendant corollary of neu-
trality. This is the myth of the virtual self: like the Kantian and
Rawlsian selves, he is a free agent of choice, freely and voluntarily
online and able to find content that he likes and absorb as much
virtual speech as he can handle from an almost endless storehouse
of possibilities. Like the Rawlsian self veiled from his private life,
the online anonym is unencumbered by his offline self because he
can surf the Internet anonymously. He can be a dog, a brave soul, or
a proud gay woman. This is the image of the virtual self described
by John Perry Barlow, early scholars of the Internet, and by Con-
gress and the Court in § 230 and Reno, respectively.
2. Assumption of Free, Voluntary Choice in Privacy Law
The notion of the online anonym as a free agent of choice has
penetrated online privacy law as well, most notably through the
related doctrines of assumption of risk and third-party disclosures.
The assumption of risk doctrine is a creature of tort law, holding
that a plaintiff cannot recover for injury from a risk created by an-
other if the plaintiff (1) possessed knowledge of the risk and (2) had
the free choice to avoid or encounter that risk. When someone exer-
cises his own volition and chooses to encounter the risk, he assumes
the risk that his behavior could lead to injury and, therefore, cannot
recover.96 Justice Cardozo explained it best in Murphy v. Steeplechase
Amusement:97 "One who takes part in [a potentially dangerous activ-
ity] accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious
and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by his an-
96 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 496A (1965).
- 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929).
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tagonist or a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact with the
ball." 98 Free choice, therefore, is an essential element of the assump-
tion of risk logic: If the risk is mandatory or unavoidable, the risk is
forced, not voluntarily assumed.
The assumption of risk doctrine, and its requirement of free
choice, bleeds from tort law into privacy law, where the risk in-
volved is not physical injury, but the voluntary disclosure of secrets
or personal information to one person or a small group, with the
attendant risk of further public disclosure. Several courts have held
that information "publicly and openly" disclosed to a small group
of friends or co-workers could extinguish any lingering privacy in-
terest in that information.99 Those disclosures "were freely offered
to the persons around her without concern of the impact it might
have on her character," 10 0 without concern that the information dis-
closed might in turn be transferred from the few to the many, from
friends to strangers, or from a private third party to the govern-
ment. Personal data "voluntarily" given to a credit card company
can be rented or purchased by third parties for the same reason:
there is no continued privacy interest in material you part with of
your own accord. 101
This neo-Kantian notion of the free and voluntary actor choos-
ing to disclose despite these risks is the basis for the third party doc-
98 Id. at 174.
99 Fisher v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation and Correction, 578 N.E.2d 901, 903 (Ohio
Ct. Cl. 1988).
100 Id. See also, e.g., Killilea v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 499 N.E.2d 1291, 1295 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1985) ("There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity
to information about the plaintiff that . . . the plaintiff leaves open to the public
eye.").
101 Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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trine announced in Smith v. Maryland.10 2 In that case, the Court ap-
proved the warrantless use of a pen register to record the numbers
dialed from a telephone at person's home because there could be no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information - like the phone
numbers you dial - voluntarily turned over to the phone company
in the normal course of business.10 3 The same is true for bank rec-
ords1°4 and it is applicable online. In United States v. Hambrick,10 5 for
example, a court found no legitimate expectation of privacy in ISP
records - including a user's name, address, credit card number,
email address, home and work telephone numbers, fax number,
and the user's associated IP address - because users entering into
agreements with their ISP "knowingly reveal[]" all that information
as a condition of Internet access. 10 6 And in United States v. Forrest-
er,107 the Ninth Circuit held that using a mirror port on an individu-
al's account with his ISP did not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search.108 A mirror port is akin to a pen register: where the latter
records the phone numbers a person dials, the former records the
to/from addresses of all incoming and outgoing email addresses
and the IP addresses of websites visited. True to the neo-Kantian
notion of free choice, the court concluded that there could be no
legitimate expectation of privacy in that information since it was
"voluntarily turned over" to the ISP.109 In these decisions permitting
further disclosure, the courts assumed that an internet user is a free
102 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
103 Id. at 742.
104 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
10555 F. Supp. 2d 504 (W.D. Va. 1999).
106 Id. at 508.
10 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008).
1
0
8 Id. at 509.
109 Id. at 510.
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agent of choice who already voluntarily disclosed the information
at issue.
3. Effects of the Myth of the Online Self on Internet Society and
Online Privacy
Other scholars, like Danielle Keats Citron,110 Azy Barak"' and
Mary Anne Franks,11 2 have discussed the ways in which the appar-
ent lawlessness of the virtual world has wreaked havoc on women,
endangering their lives, threatening their personal and professional
success, and silencing their speech. Repeating their persuasive work
would be redundant and beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I
would like to supplement their analyses and touch on two addi-
tional implications of the myth of the online anonym: a lack of re-
sponsibility and an inability to address group defamation and hate.
First, the myth has emptied the Internet of responsibility by fos-
tering the perception that the virtual world is somehow ephemeral
and less real. As Mary Anne Franks has argued, this "idealism" in
the virtual world has minimized the "realness" of cyberharassment
while elevating the "realness" of cyberspeech, valuing the latter
above the former." 3 To idealists who see the virtual world as a
space of true freedom, cyberspace is "more real than real life." Yet,
at the same time, harms inflicted on others in the virtual world are
dismissed as "'not really real,' as they are by their nature not physi-
110 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2009).
111 See Azy Barak, Sexual Harassment on the Internet, 23 Soc. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 77
(2005), available at http://construct.haifa.ac.il/-azy/SexualHarassmentBarak.pdf.
112 E.g., Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655 (2012).
113 Franks, Unwilling Avatars, supra note 7, at 226.
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cal, bodily harms."114 This means that virtual speech is real and de-
mands the utmost protection, while cyberharassment is not real ag-
gression and need not be taken seriously. As a result, Professor
Franks argues, we see cases where sex-based harassment is ignored
simply because it happens online.115 This confusion of "realness"
derives from Kant and Rawls and the mistaken idea that the virtual
world is like the autonomous realms where everyone is free and
unencumbered. Those philosophical constructs were meant to be
ideals, but the inviolability of the individual implied by them and
their very nature as separate and apart from the physical world
simultaneously elevates the person and diminishes the space. The
erosion of privacy buttresses this perception. The ease with which
mandatorily disclosed information can be turned over to the gov-
ernment or third parties fosters the erroneous idea that privacy
cannot exist online and contributes to a sense of lawlessness in the
virtual space.
Second, strict enforcement of neutrality strips the law of tools
necessary to combat identity-based hate and harassment. Digitized
harassment can take many forms, from posting a doctored photo-
graph on Flickr of a victim with the words "sucks dick" scrawled
across his face to posting a video on YouTube and using words like
"whore," "dyke," "a dirty Jew" or "all faggots must die" in refer-
ence to a particular target or targets. It is not clear that a liberal free
speech jurisprudence can adequately address this kind of personal
and group defamation in the physical world, let alone online.1 16




115 Franks, Sexual Harassment, supra note 112, at 663-69.
116 See Ari Ezra Waldman, All Those Like You: Identity Aggression and Student Speech,
77 Mo. L. REV. 1 (2012).
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personhood and demean it, deprive it of value, and use it as a
weapon. They attack women,117 racial minorities,118 religious minor-
ities,119 and other traditionally victimized groups. And, as such,
they attack not only their particular victims but also their victims'
communities. Identity-based aggressors interfere with victims' ac-
cess to education, their liberty to express who they are, their right to
participate in the body politic, and perpetuate the legitimacy of a
social stigma attached to any given minority. 120 But Rawls's Political
Liberalism strips the law of the tools necessary to address this prob-
lem for two reasons. First, victims of identity-based harassment
have to leave their social identities at the political door, making it
difficult for a liberal regime to conceive of group harm. Second,
strict neutrality denies the difference between attacks on identity
and identity-affirming speech. If the state is truly to remain neutral
in the debates of its citizens, there could be no legal distinction be-
tween wearing a t-shirt to school that makes fun of same-sex attrac-
tion121 and one that says, "Jesus was not a homophobe." 122 The lib-
eral would say that both forms of expression deserve to be heard
117 See Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 63-67.
118 See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cnty., 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam); Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cnty. Fla., 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000).
119 Corilyn Shropshire, Deniers of Holocaust Tap Facebook to Spread Message: Facebook
Wrestles with Anti-Semitism, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (May 15, 2009) http://www.chron
.com/life/houston-belief/article/ Deniers-of-Holocaust-tap-Facebook-to-spread-
1749168.php.
120 See Waldman, All Those Like You, supra note 116.
121 Jim Lopata, ACLUS Defends Anti-Gay T-Shirt, BOSTON SPIRIT (Mar. 2, 2013),
http:/ /www.boston.com/lifestyle/blogs/bostonspirit/2013/03/aclu-defends anti-
gay-t-shirt.html.
122 James Eng, Teen Wins Right to Wear "Jesus Is Not a Homophobe" T-Shirt to




and cannot be restricted. And yet, we know that harassing words
can have particularly devastating effects that identity-affirming
speech does not. Therefore, the supposed neutrality of the state
when it comes to speech is not neutrality at all, but rather a value
judgment that words either cannot cause harm or that the harm
they do cause is not a social ill for the state or society to solve.
II. WHO IS THE REAL VIRTUAL SELF?
I have argued that a false conception of the virtual self - one
who freely, autonomously, and anonymously governs his own
online experience - has been the foundation of online speech and
privacy jurisprudence. To illustrate how, I have compared the myth
of the online anonym to the Kantian self in the intelligible realm
and Rawls's political conception of the person who brackets away
his private life when considering matters of public concern. I then
showed how these conceptions of the self, and their correlative
principles of neutrality and choice, pervade modem First Amend-
ment and privacy jurisprudence. Finally, I argued that this vision
has had serious negative effects on online society. In this section, I
would like to replace the Internet myth with a more accurate de-
scription of the virtual self, one that reflects the sociology of the In-
ternet: who we are, why we are online, and what kind of Internet
society we want.
Like the Kantian and Rawlsian selves, which ignore important
constituent elements of our identity and decision-making processes,
the myth of the online anonym is wrong because it inaccurately de-
scribes who we are online. We are not anonymous, we are not au-
tonomous, and we are not voluntary agents of choice. We are, at a
minimum, traceable, with online anonymity, if it ever existed,
quickly becoming a thing of the past. Our online interactions are
entirely dependent upon intermediaries who "push" content on us,
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minimizing our mastery of our online experience. And many of us
are online involuntarily, placed there by others - maliciously or not
- and forced into a public virtual world to participate in modern
society. These observable, sociological claims, together with the
recognition that most, if not all, of us have or will soon have a vir-
tual presence, represent the fully constituted virtual self. He is
bound up with his physical identity, dependent on others for in-
formation, and an often-unwilling participant in online society. His
vision of the virtual world should, therefore, look quite different
from that of the online anonym. Unlike the myth of the online ano-
nym who, like Kant's and Rawls's vision of the self, informs speech
and privacy doctrines that focus on neutrality and choice, the fully
constituted virtual self should reorient of our speech and privacy
regimes to reflect Emile Durkheim's thesis on the interconnected-
ness of all things.
A. A SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF THE RAWLSIAN SELF
Kant and Rawls may have created a liberating vision of the self
as an unfettered agent of free choice, free from the nasty prejudices
of everyday life, but they have left our physical and virtual societies
bereft of meaning greater than ourselves. Both worlds are devoid of
the ideals to which many of us strive: we are uncivil to each oth-
er,123 we have little need for social norms, 124 and we make life un-
safe for others.12
123 Our society needed an unspeakable tragedy, like the 2011 shooting of Repre-
sentative Gabrielle Giffords, to start encouraging us to act more civilly to one another
in our public discourse. A civil discourse institute was created. See, e.g., Ewan
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For the remainder of this Article, I will show how the radical,
detached individual of Kant and Rawls is not who we are online
and, therefore, should not be the basis of our Internet speech and
privacy jurisprudence. I replace the liberal self with a sociological
theory of the Internet based on empirical observation of online so-
cial life and the theories of Emile Durkheim. Though heavily influ-
enced by Kantian conceptions of the individual,126 Durkheim saw
humanity as diverse, social, and interdependent. It is our member-
ship in a society that defines who we are, not our capacity to sepa-
rate ourselves from the formal and informal regulatory boundaries
of modern social life. Becoming radically independent, would create
anomie, or a sense of dissonance, emptiness, and lack of belong-
ing. 27 Durkheim has, therefore, done more than accurately describe
the observables of online life as one of interconnectedness and re-
mix. He has also diagnosed the Internet's cancer: the anomie reflect-
ed in the law of online speech and privacy.
Durkheim observed a modern world defined by the intercon-
nectedness and interdependence of all things. The project of his ca-
reer was to explain how society functioned and how its individual
MacAskill, Bill Clinton and George Bush Sr. Open US Centre for Political Civility in Ari-
zona, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/
feb/21/us-centre-political-civility-arizona. But our political and online discourse is
as uncivil as ever.
124 Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 62-63 (citing ROSCOE POUND, SOCIAL
CONTROL THROUGH LAW 18 (1942)). In person, we exert pressure on one another to
maintain civil society and avoid anti-social behavior; those pressures are less power-
ful online today.
125 Danielle Citron illustrated how dangerous life can be for women and minori-
ties online. See id. at 69-80, 85-86.
126 See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, Individuals and the Intellectuals, in EMILE DURKHEIM:
ON MORALITY AND SOCIETY, 44-49 (Robert N. Bellah ed., 1973).
127 DURKHEIM, DOL, supra note 12, at 304.
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constitutive members could exist independently and as part of a
collective social unit.128 For Durkheim, "[slociety is a reality sui gen-
eris," with its own characteristics not found in its individual mem-
bers or elsewhere, and, therefore, prior to the individual. 1 29 It is a
thing, a "social fact" into which we are born that mediates and obli-
gates us in various ways. 130 This makes intuitive sense: we are all
born into families with collective histories and are all subject to the
same norms of social interaction. These histories and norms exist
before us and mediate our lives and interactions from the start. But
for Durkheim, social norms are more than just mediators and regu-
lators of behavior; they are, in fact, what bind diverse and distinc-
tive individuals together. Everything, therefore, is social: we con-
ceive of religion,131 family, 132 law, 133 and even time,134 space, 135 and
logical thought 136 through the tinted lenses of our social network.
So, too, is man. Whereas Kant saw a duality between man's purely
rational, human self and his determined, animal self, subject to in-
clinations, Durkheim sees man as both individual and social. The
individual side originates within us, but our social side "represents
within us the higher reality of the intellectual and moral order," i.e.,
society.137 In an obvious departure from Kant, Durkheim says that
128 For scholarly analyses of Durkheim's life's work, see, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS,
CAPITALISM AND MODERN SOCIAL THEORY 65-118,185-242 (1971).
129 DURKHEIM, ELEMENTARY FORMS, supra note 12, at 17-18.
130 
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 50-51 (Steven Lukes
ed., W.D. Halls trans., 1982) [hereafter DURKHEIM, RULES].
131 DURKHEIM, ELEMENTARY FORMS, supra note 12, at 11, 42.
132 DURKHEIM, DoL, supra note 12, at 20-21.
133 Id. at 24-26. Law, in fact, is a model for that which reflects solidarity in society.
134 ELEMENTARY FORMS, supra note 12, at 12.
135 Id. at 13.
136 Id. at 331.
137 Id. at 18.
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society exists before the individual, and because man is at once an
individual and a social being, "it is impossible to reduce reason to
[just] individual experience."
138
But society does not erase the individual. In fact, the social forc-
es binding individuals together are founded upon the interdepend-
ence created by social diversity and complementarity. Individual-
ism and increased specialization in all areas of life create a society
based on a "system of different and special functions united by def-
inite relationships" 139 where we depend on one another rather than
resemble one another. The more labor is divided, the more person-
alized our work becomes, and the greater the importance of the in-
dividual in society. But, at the same time, our interdependence in-
creases. 140 In this regard, no man is ever an island unto himself; in-
dividual persons "always lack something, and the best among us
feel our own inadequacy." 141 And so we seek out that which we
lack, bringing in friends, companions, and co-workers to comple-
ment and complete us. As members of society, individuals are in-
terdependent, bound together, and mediated by strong social soli-
darity with others; they are not radically individuated atoms with
total control over their paths and destinies. Therefore, there can be
no radically individuated anonym.
Such separation from society into a world of unfettered auton-
omy, or the virtual world of the liberal self and online anonym, is
an aberration away from solidarity to what Durkheim calls anomie,
or a feeling of the absence of belonging, a listless dissonance in
times of social crisis caused by radical individuation and the ab-
138 Id.
139 DURKHiEIM, DoL, supra note 12, at 83.
141 Id. at 85.
141 Id. at 17.
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sence of sufficient law and regulation binding the individual to so-
ciety.142 Normally, increased interdependence allows for the natural
emergence of sufficient rules and norms to govern interaction.
143
Anomie is an "abnormal" social state that arises from a situation
with too little social regulation of the individual,""' thus allowing
the individual to wander away from the meaning and values that
social solidarity impresses upon him.
It stands to reason, then, that separation from society into an
"ideal" purely autonomous realm would strip the individual of his
humanity, placing him and his autonomous realm into a constant
state of anomie. "It is not true ... that humanity can be released
from all restraint," 145 Durkheim writes in his seminal work on the
sociology of suicide. No such thing is really possible because "[a]ll
existence being a part of the universe is relative to the remainder; its
nature and method of manifestation accordingly depend not only
on itself but on other beings, who consequently restrain and regu-
late it." 146 The world according to Durkheim, therefore, is character-
ized by an individual and social identity entirely bound up with
one another and by individuals who find harmony only through
interdependence and social integration. The analogy to online life
should be apparent: Unlike the liberal self who separates himself
from the limitations of the physical world and exists online as an
autonomous agent of free choice, the Durkheimian self is a social
142 Id. at 304.
143 Id. at 302.
144 EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY 258 (John A. Spaulding and
George Simpson trans., 1997) [hereafter DURKHEIM, SUICIDE]; DURKHEIM, DoL, supra
note 12, at 304.
145 DURKHEIM, SUICIDE, supra note 144, at 252.
146 Id.
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self, automatically joining a virtual community that integrates,
regulates, and educates.
The clearest explanation of this thesis appears in Durkheim's
discussion of religion. In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,
Durkheim used his own and others' observation of primitive peo-
ples and their religious rites to conclude that the origins of religion
are social and, specifically, the regular group-based rituals that im-
bue the individual with collective meaning and renew the sanctity
of the group's religious objects. 147 Even in this arena of social life,
where an ideal world of sacred objects and ideal values can exist
separate from the profane existence of everyday life, 148 no real sepa-
ration is possible because meaning in one is impossible without the
other. That is, if an ideal world based on sacred objects, ritual, and
social unity can exist, the "ideal society is not outside the real socie-
ty; it is part of it. Far from being torn between them. . . we cannot
insist on one without insisting on the other. For a society is not
simply constituted by the mass of individuals who compose it...
but above all by the idea that it fashions itself." 149 No one individual
or idea can separate itself from society and retain its humanity or
meaning, respectively. In Durkheim's world, there is no Kantian
intelligible realm where man can remove the bonds of the body and
social life and act autonomously and freely. For Durkheim, any
147 GIDDENS, supra note 128, at 105-18.
148 Durkheim uses the terms "sacred" and "profane" to distinguish between reli-
gious objects in which the social collective has effervesced meaning (sacred) and the
everyday things (profane). In many religions, he observed, there is a strict rule of
separation between the two, lest the profane strip the sacred of its special meaning.
DURKHEIM, ELEMENTARY FORMS, supra note 12, at 36-41. Durkheim, the scion of a
religious Jewish family and the son of a rabbi, was familiar with this separation of
sacred and profane from childhood.
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DURKHEIM, ELEMENTARY FORMS, supra note 12, at 317-18.
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such removal from society is not only empirically impossible, but
also a bad idea. After all, individualism is anomic without society.
B. THE REAL VIRTUAL SELF
Durkheim's conception of the social self - interdependent, de-
fined, and mediated by society rather than anonymous - tells a
more accurate story about who we are in an online world that, like
society in general, is a Durkheimian social fact that existed before
us, mediates us, and will continue to exist after us. First, the virtual
self is a public self, never truly anonymous or detached. Like Durk-
heim's man, his identity is an integral part of online society, a role
he is increasingly embracing as the Internet matures. Even beyond
the technological lack of anonymity, the virtual self reflects the
wants and desires of his physical brother, seeking out content and
aligning preferences that make sense only in the context of who he
is offline. Second, like the Durkheimian man born into and mediat-
ed by social norms, the virtual self is a mediated self, never truly au-
tonomous. He has only second-hand control over the content he
sees, as all content and all online interactions occur over platforms
run, organized, and censored by private companies like Facebook,
Google, and Yahoo. Like a man situated within society, where social
norms govern and mediate his experiences, the virtual self's online
experience depends upon his relationship with Internet intermedi-
aries and the bilateral obligations between them. Third, the virtual
self is often an involuntary self, entering a Durkheimian society that
predated him. He often has no choice but to join the online world.
And, fourth, the virtual self is universal; in some form, we are all
part of the online world. This idea is at the foundation of Durk-
heim's sociology: all men are social, part of networks larger than
and prior to themselves. Like Durkheim's vision that society is the
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source of all things, connecting individuals to one another in me-
chanical and organic ways, the virtual self is bound up with both
the physical and online worlds in a way that John Perry Barlow
never understood. The virtual self is nothing without a robust In-
ternet community that is more than just the sum of independent
agents.
1. A Public Self
The virtual self is a public self in two distinct ways: first, ano-
nymity per se does not exist on the Internet, and even perceived an-
onymity, where the user believes his identity is hidden, is on the
decline; second, his experience is inexorably tied to the wants, de-
sires and preferences of his physical counterpart, making it difficult
to hide who he really is.
Daniel Solove notes that what exists on the Internet today is a
balance between anonymity and accountability, or "traceable ano-
nymity." On this theory, we allow virtual selves to speak anony-
mously online, but preserve trails of breadcrumbs to identify online
speakers when they cause others harm.150 It is easy, Solove suggests,
to blog anonymously about Article III judges 51 or about politics in
Pittsburgh,152 but it is almost impossible to be untraceable because
150 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY
ON THE INTERNET 146 (2007) (citing Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Consider-
ing Transparency, Anonymity, and Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problems of
Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 991, 1028, 1032, 1044
(2004)).
151 David Lat, who now runs the blog Above the Law, blogged anonymously un-
der the pseudonym "Article III Groupie" at the blog "Underneath Their Robes,"
before outing himself in The New Yorker. SOLOVE, infra note 263, at 136-139.
152 "PittGirl" blogged about politics in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania before outing
herself in 2009. John D. Sutter, The Coming-Out Stories of Anonymous Bloggers,
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the user's IP address is logged with each Internet interaction. That
IP address does not simply exist on the Internet in some ethereal
form; the IP address of the user's computer, the ISP that provided
the address, and even the geographic location of the ISP are all
available. If an anonymous blogger posts from his work computer,
his employer will know; if he posts from home, his ISP will know. 15
3
All that sounds very technical and difficult,154 but even if these
coded breadcrumbs were inaccessible to an Internet user with only
an average understanding of computers, much of our online behav-
ior leaves traces that can lead to our physical selves. Zip codes,
gender, and dates of birth, all identifying data that we key in to
online dialog boxes on a regular basis, can be used to "re-identif[y]"
a "large portion" of the United States population.155 Even simple
searches on Google, Yahoo, or Bing can be used to identify a partic-
ular user.1
56
CNN.COM (Aug. 21, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-08-
21/tech/outing.anonymous.bloggers-l-bloggers-online-anonymity-
persona?_s=PM:TECH.
153 SOLOVE, infra note 263, at 147.
154 It isn't. In some cases, that information is hand-delivered to users. At the blog
Concurring Opinions (www.concurringopinions.com), for example, where I am a
frequent contributor, whenever a user posts a comment to post I have written, an
email report is delivered to my email inbox identifying the IP address of the com-
menter and a link to the American Registry of Internet Numbers (ARIN) to deter-
mine the commenter's ISP and the ISP's geographic location. In any event, what is
difficult is making yourself untraceable. SOLOVE, supra note 150, at 147 (citing Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation, How to Blog Safely (About Work or Anything Else), Apr. 6,
2005, at http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Anonymity/blog-anonymously.php).
155 SOLOVE, infra note 263, at 147 (citing Ralph Gross & Alessandro Acquisti, Infor-
mation Revelation and Privacy in Online Social Networks (The Facebook Case), ACM
Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, Nov. 7, 2005, at § 4.2).
156 SOLOVE, infra note 263, at 147 (citing Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face
Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 2006, at Al). Professor
Solove argues that this "traceable anonymity" is a good balance: it allows online
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This kind of traceability seems to be the baseline of anonymity
in today's Internet. As Professor Solove has discussed at length,
governments and businesses are collecting dossiers of information
about people, threatening privacy.15 7 Yet even on a less sinister lev-
el, our online interactions are increasingly dependent on providing
identification. Facebook, whose Statement of Rights and Responsi-
bilities requires real names and emails to register, 158 has more than
one billion active users every month.15 9 Facebook also maintains
close relationships with law enforcement, pursuant to which, the
company not only complies with all subpoenas for information
about potential illegal activity, but also offers that information
when it has "a good faith belief it is necessary to prevent fraud or
other illegal activity, to prevent imminent bodily harm, or to pro-
tect" users from those who violate the Facebook terms of service.
160
The company also uses facial recognition software to identify users
users to benefit from a cloak of anonymity, but provides adequate protection for
those harmed by anonymous harassment. It is not clear, however, that traceable
anonymity adequately protects the harassed victim, who must spend the time, mon-
ey and energy uncovering the identity of his attacker or defamer, a process that Pro-
fessor Solove admits can be cumbersome. See SOLOVE, infra note 263, at 142-46 (dis-
cussing the case of John Seigenthaler, a journalist, who was defamed on Wikipedia as
being involved in the Kennedy assassination, and his and the Wikipedia critic David
Bradnt's lumbering journey to find the user who edited Mr. Seigenthaler's Wikipedia
page).
1
5 7 See id. at vii. See also SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004).
15 Disabled - lnauthentic Account, FACEBOOK https://www.facebook.com/help
/?page=1132 (last visited March 14, 2013).
159 Mark Zuckerberg, One Billion People on Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Oct. 4,
2012), http://newsroom.fb.com/News/457/One-Billion-People-on-Facebook.
160 How does Facebook work with law enforcement?, FACEBOOK, https://www.face
book.com/help/131535283590645/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
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in friends' photographs.1 61 More websites are requiring users to reg-
ister with a recognized and functioning email address or Facebook
account before they can comment on news stories
162 or blog posts. 163
And anonymity is on the decline everywhere. A New York City
woman who recently tangled with a train conductor by telling him,
"Do you know what schools I've been to and how well-educated I
am?" was identified when a fellow rider posted a video on
YouTube; 164 after Vancouver lost the Stanley Cup, looters were
identified when friends tagged their pictures online; 165 and a 40-
year-old British man could not keep his deceitful "Gay Girl in Da-
mascus" blog alive when his identity was so readily available.
166
Anonymity is on the decline. Increasingly, anonymous web in-
teractions will be the bastions of the shameful: "Anonymity online
will gradually become a lot like anonymity in the real world. When
we encounter it, we'll take a firm grip on our wallet and leave the
neighborhood as soon as possible-unless we're doing something
we're ashamed of."167 Web 2.0's interactivity is giving way to "Web
161 Bloomberg News, Facebook 'Face Recognition' Feature Draws Privacy Scrutiny,
NEW YORK TIMES (June 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/O9/technology
/09facebook.html ?.r=0.
162 See, e.g., SAN DIEGO GAY AND LESBIAN NEWS, www.sdgln.com (last visited
March 13, 2013).
163 See, e.g., CONCURRING OPINIONS, www.concurringopinions.com (last visited
March 13, 2013).
164 Brian Stelter, Upending Anonymity, These Days the Web Unmasks Everyone, NEW




167 Janna Anderson and Lee Rainie, The Future of the Internet, PEW INTERNET, 40-41
(2010), http://www.pewintemet.org/Reports/2010/Future-of-the-Internet-IV.aspx
(follow "Download" hyperlink) (quoting Stewart Baker, Internet legal expert at Step-
toe & Johnson LLP).
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3.0," or a completely integrated virtual world that can track our lo-
cations and tailor content to our longitude and latitude. It is chang-
ing the way we conceive of our place in the world since:
[tihe seamless integration of these technologies into the
spaces and places of our everyday lives . . .compromises
physical and social boundaries in private and public
spheres. This potential to be caught within a web of con-
stant accessibility, visibility, and exposure challenges our
fundamental ideas about personal space and boundaries,
and the privacy expectations that accompany them.
168
The virtual world is leaving a deeper digital footprint in our lives,
leading to a world where there is "no place left to hide." 169 Many
scholars agree.
170
But even if these portends of the future do not come true, online
users are still tied to their physical selves in more subtle, yet pro-
found, ways. In our desire to connect - something Durkheim sug-
168 Anne Uteck, Ubiquitous Computing and Spatial Privacy, in LESSONS FROM THE
IDENTITY TRAIL, ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 83
(Ian Kerr et al. eds., 2009) available at http://www.idtrail.org/files/ID%20Trail%20
Book/9780195372472_kerr_05.pdf.
169 No Anonymity on Future Web Says Google CEO, ITPROPORTAL (Aug. 5, 2010),
http://www.itproportal.com/2010/08/05/no-anonymity-future-web-says-google-
ceo/. See also John Markoff, Taking the Mystery Out of Web Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES
(July 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/weekinreview/04markoff.ht
ml? r=2.
170 Anderson and Rainie, supra note 167 at 40-41 (gathering comments from Inter-
net experts, including Susan Crawford - "We're moving into an increasingly authen-
ticated and permission-based world. We'll be known to others as a condition of do-
ing what we want to do. That may not be all bad news - we'll get loyalty points, after
all ... When it comes to commerce, anonymity is over." - Oscar Gandy - "Anonymi-
ty will increasingly be associated with 'antisocial' behavior, and it will be moved to
the boundaries or fringes of the net." - and others).
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gests is natural for all humans 171 - we go online for a reason, leav-
ing clues as to who we are and tying our virtual selves to our physi-
cal selves in very real ways. This is not about anonymity per se; we
do not always go online with nametags brandishing our IP address-
es, email accounts, and dates of birth for everyone to see all the
time. Rather, our online activities link our virtual and physical iden-
tities in ways that make one meaningless without the other. And,
increasingly, many of us want it that way.
Google, Apple, Amazon, and Facebook do this most efficiently.
If you have a Gmail account, Google tailors your experience to what
it learns about you from your emails and previous searches. Adver-
tisements and search terms are geared toward topics that you dis-
cuss on email or have searched before based on a complicated key
word algorithm.172 You can be directed toward The Nation's website
if you seem to discuss liberal politics, or NewsMax magazine if you
admire Paul Ryan. You are even prompted to add friends to your
network and to email compositions based on previous groups of
mail recipients in previous emails.173 Apple's iTunes program rec-
ommends music and iPhone apps that you might like based on
171 DURKHEIM, DOL supra note 12, at 17 ("However richly endowed we may be, we
always lack something, and the best among us feel our own inadequacy. This is why
we seek in our friends those qualities we lack, because in uniting with them we share
in some way their nature, feeling ourselves then less incomplete.... [The] true func-
tion [of the division of labor] is to create between two or more people a feeling of
solidarity.").
172 Autocomplete, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/websearch/bin/answer.
py?hl=en&answer=106230 (last visited Feb. 22, 2013); Ads in Gmail and Your Personal
Data, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/mail/answer/6603?hl=en (last visited
Feb. 22, 2013).
173 Maayan Roth et al., Suggesting (More) Friends Using tie Implicit Social Graph,
RESEARCH AT GOGLE, http://research.google.com/pubs/pub37120.htm (follow
"View the PDF" hyperlink).
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your previous purchases or indicated preferences. 174 Amazon rec-
ommends books for purchase based on the accumulated image of
the reader you have become over your entire history of buying
books on Amazon. 175 And LinkedIn tells you whom you might
know and recommends friends and pages that comport with the
narrative of your LinkedIn experiences to date. 176 These programs
are adaptive as well. If you like Jason Mraz, but not Justin Bieber,
iTunes knows to focus more on alternative rock than teen pop, and
Facebook might suggest that you "Like" Sara Bareillis or Colby
Caillat rather than Miley Cyrus or Selena Gomez. Once you make
those selections, the programs know not to bother you with teen
pop again. Without intermediaries that channel content based on
who we are and what we want, our Internet experience would be
completely dull, flat, and unfulfilling.
Internet users are voluntarily going further than passively al-
lowing Gmail, Apple, Amazon, and Facebook to suggest things for
them. Increasingly, we shun anonymity's liberating potential for the
global community that the Internet provides. Facebook is the para-
digmatic example among the general population, but all social net-
working and dating sites foster voluntary rejection of anonymity
every time they ask users identifying questions - What is your fa-
174 Christopher Mims, How iTunes Genius Really Works, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW
(June 2, 2010), http://www.technologyreview.com/view/419198/how-itunes-
genius-really-works/.
173 Greg Linden et al., Amazon.com Recommendations: Item-to-Item Collaborative Fil-
tering, IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING (2003), at http://www.cs.umd.edu/-samir
/498/Amazon-Recommendations.pdf.
176 Janet Ryu, People You May Know: Helping You Discover Those Important Profes-
sional Relationships, LINKEDIN BLOG (May 12, 2010), http://blog.linkedin.com/
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vorite movie? What is your work history? In what town did you
grow up? - and provide 500 characters for an answer. Whether
through traceability, adaptive learning of our preferences, or the
use of your real identity to let the Internet supplement and facilitate
physical community, the virtual world knows who we are. And
many of us increasingly want it that way, as evidenced by the ex-
ploding popularity of real-name social networking sites, location
"check ins" that allow your online followers to know where you are
in the physical world, the voluntary reporting of personal infor-
mation, the rise of online photo sharing, and the myriad examples
in which users are willing to give up personal information for gifts,
bonuses, and just the chance to win a prize.177 The list of examples
of our embrace of open identity online goes on.178 We want to par-
ticipate in the online community, not as free floating anonyms iso-
lated from those around us, but as members of a society - of liber-
als, of gays, of lovers of World of Warcraft - because social interac-
tion and interdependence create harmony and solidarity. In this
sense, the public nature of our virtual selves is rooted in Durk-
heim's sociological conception of man: he is gregarious, social, and
defined by the communities of which he is naturally a part.1 79 The
virtual world was supposed to allow us to bracket away our real
lives in the name of a freely autonomous and anonymous existence.
177 Alessandro Acquisti has done groundbreaking work in this area, proving that
individuals in the physical world and Internet consumers are willing to give up per-
sonal information for tiny benefits and better tailored experiences. See Somini
Sengupta, Letting Down Our Guard With Web Privacy, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 30,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/technology/web-privacy-and-how-
consumers-let-down-their-guard.html?pagewanted=all.
178 Of course, the next step is to empirically test this theory, which is the core of
my doctoral dissertation.
179 See supra notes 129-149 and accompanying text.
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But, as we have seen, that is not the case. Internet users do not want
to bracket their real lives; instead, they tend to act like Durkheimian
social creatures, seeking out online content that supplements their
physical selves, not supplants them.
2. A Mediated Self
In addition to seeing the individual as a member of a sui generis
society that gives him meaning, ethics, and purpose, Durkheim re-
minds us that society plays a mediating and coercive role vis-2-vis
the individual. 180 At times, social norms are reflected in law by the
criminalization of behavior that offends the deeply held beliefs of
the collective.181 At other times, social solidarity governs individual
behavior in more subtle ways, by providing a background of trust
for interpersonal relationships and the soft power of social norms.
8 2
This mediation is not purely negative; individuals derive positive
benefits from their relationship to others in society.1S
3
Similarly, the virtual self is never really a free and autonomous
agent of choice; rather, he lacks control over the content and speech
he sees online in two related ways. First, every online interaction is
governed by an intermediary - from websites like Facebook to
search engines like Google - that help determine what content is
available. Second, by identifying preferences and interests, the vir-
tual self allows intermediaries to "push" tailored content toward
him, further limiting the orbit of speech at his disposal toward that
180 DuRKHEIM, RULES, supra note 130, at 50-51.
181 DURKHEIM, DOL supra note 12, at 39-40, 50, 92-93, 97-98. Durkheim calls this
"mechanical solidarity."
182 Id. at 101-78.
183 Id. at 77-86.
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which he has previously expressed a related interest. In both of
these ways, the online experiences of the virtual self differ greatly
from the vision of the online anonym and mirror the individual cab-
ined by society in Durkheim's sociology.
An online intermediary "facilitates" interactions among third
parties on the Internet and, therefore, the definition encompasses a
host of online entities. They can be Internet service providers (ISPs),
like Comcast, Earthlink, or Netzero; web hosting providers, like Go
Daddy; search engines, like Google or the erstwhile AltaVista; e-
commerce platforms, like eBay; Internet payment systems, like
PayPal; and participative networking platforms, like blogs and
wikis.18 4 Intermediaries include websites that we use to interact
with one another (Facebook), platforms that allow us to videconfer-
ence, chat, or phone someone across the globe (Skype), and the
companies that allow the websites we use every day to run.
Every online interaction is filtered through some intermediary.
David Ardia of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Har-
vard Law School explains the pervasiveness and essential role of
online intermediaries through a seemingly simple example: upload-
ing a video on to YouTube. 185 First, the user goes to
www.youtube.com using, say, Internet Explorer, Firefox, or the new
Google Chrome. That process already involved numerous interme-
diaries:
184 The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries, OECD.ORG, 9-14 (2010),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/4/44949023.pdf.
18 See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study
of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 373, 385-86 (2010).
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All Internet communication is accomplished by splitting the
communication into data packets that are directed by spe-
cialized hardware known as routers, which are operated by
intermediaries throughout the network. These routers iden-
tify computers on the Internet by their Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses, which typically look something like 192.0.1.123.
Because human beings cannot easily remember this string
of numbers, the domain name system (DNS) allows mne-
monic names to be associated with IP addresses. When an
Internet user enters one of these domain names into her
web browser, for example YouTube.com, her computer
sends a request to a DNS server, typically operated by her
Internet Service Provider (ISP) or another intermediary that
maintains a lookup table associating the name with a spe-
cific IP address.18
6
Once at the YouTube website, the user signs on and uploads the
video. But the video does not go directly to YouTube; rather, the
video goes from the user's computer onto a network run by an ISP,
which in turn sends the data - packets of l's and O's that constitute
the video - via "multiple intermediaries that provide 'peering con-
nections,' to the network owned by the ISP that services
YouTube."187 In other words, the user's ISP sends data through fel-
low, or "peer," ISPs to the provider that runs YouTube. From there,
the data go to YouTube's servers, which will host the video. And
when someone else wants to view this video, the sequence is re-
18
6 Id. (citing Lawrence B. Solum and Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet
Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 847 (2004)); see also Jonathan
Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1980 (2006).
187 Ardia, supra note 185, at 386.
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versed: data travel from YouTube's servers through to YouTube's
ISP and through peers until it reaches the viewer's ISP and, ulti-
mately, the viewer's desktop, laptop or mobile device.
188
This happens in an instant, suggesting to the untrained eye that
the original user and the subsequent viewer had total control over
the process.189 In fact, these intermediaries provide important func-
tions for the virtual self's online experiences. Without them, the In-
ternet would be an inhospitable place, difficult for users to sift
through the noise until they find the content they want. This works
in two ways. First, intermediaries control unwanted content, such
as spain and malware, and unwanted attacks, such as viruses and
Trojan horses.190 While this used to be done through firewalls and
filtering software installed in the end user's computer, most of these
functions are now integrated into the network itself. Network pro-
viders include proprietary antivirus and firewall protections as part
of accessing their system, assuming the protection function as an
intermediary. 191 Second, intermediaries not only block bad content,
but they also help users identify the content they want. Since the
creation of the Internet and the proliferation of user-generated con-
tent through Web 2.0, the amount of content available online has
grown. It would be impossible for the average user to sift through
an unorganized multitude of data to find the particular information
he needs, so he depends on a variety of "content aggregators," such
188 Id.
189 Recall the discrepancy between how many Internet users think email works
(See Figure 1, supra) and how email actually gets from sender to recipient (See Figure
2, supra).
190 Christopher Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Uninternediated
Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 703-4 (2010).
191 Id. at 705.
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as bloggers, search engines, and bulletins to identify and retrieve
content.1 92 The most effective aggregators are adaptive; they learn
from their users' habits, preferences and previous searches to help
them find future content that would likely want. 193 This is why
Google has generally supplanted every search engine competitor:
its search algorithms are the best at identifying the content its users
prefer.
But Google's algorithms are not the only means by which our
online experiences are not entirely our own. The free speech regime
created by § 230 immunity and Reno v. ACLU allows harassing and
threatening conduct to pop up and remain on websites not other-
wise devoted to such material, thus, as Danielle Citron has noted,
"increas[ing] the likelihood that children and unwilling adults will
encounter it."194 This material becomes difficult to avoid not only
because it can show up anywhere - and websites and ISPs are not
liable when it does - but also because individual users do not have
the power to avoid it even if they knew about it. Fans of former Re-
publican Senator Rick Santorum have this problem. When you type
in "rick santorum" into a Google search, two of the first four results
include a graphic definition for a sexual neologism.195 In response to
offensive comments then-Senator Santorum made about gays and
homosexuality in general, 196 sex columnist Dan Savage created the
192 Id. at 707.
193 Id. at 707 (citing Greg Lastowska, Google's Law, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 1327, 1334-37
(2008)).
194 Citron, supra note 41, at 85.
195 Steve Peoples, Santorum Talks About Longtime Google Problem, ROLL CALL (Feb.
16, 2011), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_84/-203455-1.html.
196 Id. Santorum told the Associated Press that gay sex could "undermine the fab-
ric of our society" and compared gay sex with "man on child, man on dog" relation-
ships. Id. ("And if the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual sex
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website www.spreadingsantorum.com and tied it to a contest in
which he asked readers to submit definitions for the term "santo-
rum." Using extensive links to other sites, Savage made sure that
the winning definition would be among the top search results in
any search.197 This may have been the first "Google bomb" in the
political arena, but cases like this have plagued and harassed ordi-
nary individuals long before Mr. Santorum found himself a victim
of his own bigotry and Mr. Savage's revenge.
198
Whatever the advantages and disadvantages of intermedia-
tion,199 it is clear that we are not free and autonomous agents of
choice online. Our experiences are often dictated or, at a minimum,
influenced by intermediaries that help us block unwanted content
and help us find the content we seek. The real virtual self is, like the
individual in Durkheim's sociology, mediated and influenced by
the institutions of society into which he is born. Durkheim calls
these social institutions, "social facts," or the things of life that are
within your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polyga-
my, you have the right to incest, you have the right to adultery. You have the right to
anything. Does that undermine the fabric of our society? I would argue yes, it
does.").
197 Id.
198 See, e.g., Citron, supra note 41, at 71-74 (discussing the pattern of attacks on fe-
male law students that occurred on the site AutoAdmit in 2007, where one partici-
pant in the "Google bombing" campaign stated explicitly that he was "not going to
let that bitch have her own blog be the first result from googling her name!").
199 It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter this debate. See generally, e.g., Oren
Bracha and Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accounta-
bility in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1161-79 (2008); Jennifer A Chan-
dler, A Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary Bias on the Internet, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095 (2007); Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The
Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 105 (2010).
For the purposes of identifying the real virtual self, it is enough to note that his
online experiences are mediated.
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external and coerce us.200 Belief is a social fact, as is marriage, sister-
hood, religion, customary practices, and even lasting phenomena
like traffic jams: we did not create them, but rather entered into a
world in which they exist. We do not control them; rather, they me-
diate our experiences and make us act in a certain way. They are
"the beliefs, tendencies, and practices of the group taken collective-
ly." 201 Consider the example of marriage: 2 2 it existed before us and
it uses the social norms with which it has been imbued over the
years to coerce social behavior both outside its bonds - social norms
encourage people to marry and to hold the institution in some de-
gree of esteem - and inside its limits - norms within marriage de-
fine anything from the impropriety of adultery to the importance of
showing love and affection to the need to live together. Internet in-
termediation is similarly a social fact. The problem, as discussed
above, is that the online speech law has stripped it of social respon-
sibility and online privacy law has ignored intermediation to the
detriment of privacy rights.
The reality of Internet intermediation has other implications,
most notably by leveling a likely fatal attack on part of the Court's
reasoning Reno v. ACLU. Reno involved a constitutional challenge to
the Communications Decency Act (CDA), most of which the Su-
preme Court struck down.20 3 The CDA's restrictions on indecent
material would have passed constitutional muster, the Court said,
had Internet intermediaries been more like broadcasters, who force
200 DURKHEIM, RULES, supra note 130, at 50-51.
201 Id. at 54.
202 1 discuss this example at length in Waldman, Marriage Rights and the Good Life:
A Sociological Theory of Marriage and Constitutional Law, 64 HASTINGS L.J. - (2013) (on
record with the Journal of Law & Liberty).
203 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870-73, 877.
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their content into people's homes. Internet communications, the
Court believed, "do not 'invade' an individual's home or appear on
one's computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content
'by accident. '"' 2 4 That, however, is not the case. Passwords, age ver-
ification, and warning pages may exist to block some indecent con-
tent from users, but even the Reno Court admitted that those tech-
nologies are unreliable. 20 5 Unpleasant content, indecent pictures,
and threatening speech are constantly "pushed" on the Internet us-
er by Google bombings and other manipulations and by the perva-
sive proliferation of harassing and sexually suggestive content on
sites not otherwise focused on such material.2 6 Intermediation, and
the lack of autonomy that comes with it, make avoiding bad content
more difficult than Internet libertarians would have us believe.
3. An Involuntary Self
As an individual who enters society and social institutions that
are external and prior to himself, Durkheim's conception of man
must join society. He neither wants to avoid it,207 lest he be thrust
204 Id. at 869 (citing Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844).
20- Id. at 856.
206 Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 85. See also Mark S. Kende, Regulating
Internet Pornography Aimed at Children: A Comparative Constitutional Perspective on
Passing the Camel Through the Needle's Eye, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1630-31 (2007).
Professor Kende correctly notes that the Internet "is more dangerous and print or
broadcast" because interactivity and anonymity allow pedophiles to prey on chil-
dren. Id. at 1630. Only when anonymity evolves into real traceability and the ethos of
lawlessness created by Section 230 and Reno is lifted will the Internet become a safer
place for children.
20 See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
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into a state of anomie,208 nor can he, because it is impossible to ig-
nore the empirical social fact of social institutions around him.
2°9
Similarly, many of us find that we must join the virtual world, lest
we be left behind in social, professional, and political circles. And
yet the concept of the free and autonomous online anonym is
anathema to involuntariness. There are voluntary, involuntary, and
constructively involuntary Internet users, whose fate cannot be un-
derstood by reference to the online anonym.
By using this range of voluntariness, I refer to a standard legal
definition running through terms such as "gift," 210 "voluntary
statement," 211 or "voluntary confession," 212 all of which imply some
level of freedom on the part of the actor. John Locke explained the
208 See supra notes 1422-144 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 129-138 and accompanying text.
210 Black's Law Dictionary defines gift as "the voluntary transfer of property to
another without compensation." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 757 (9th ed. 2009).
211 Black's Law Dictionary defines a voluntary statement as a "statement made
without the influence of duress, coercion, or inducement." Id. at 1539.
212 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-28 (1973) (discussing the defini-
tion of "voluntariness" when it comes to a confession). "The notion of 'voluntari-
ness,' Mr. Justice Frankfurter once wrote, 'is itself an amphibian.' It cannot be taken
literally to mean a 'knowing' choice. 'Except where a person is unconscious or
drugged or otherwise lacks capacity for conscious choice, all incriminating state-
ments - even those made under brutal treatment - are 'voluntary' in the sense of
representing a choice of alternatives. On the other hand, if 'voluntariness' incorpo-
rates notions of 'but for' cause, the question should be whether the statement would
have been made even absent inquiry or other official action. Under such a test, virtu-
ally no statement would be voluntary because very few people give incriminating
statements in the absence of official action of some kind.'. . . 'The ultimate test re-
mains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts
for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to
confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his
capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends
due process."' Id. at 224-35 (internal citations omitted).
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differences between voluntary, involuntary, and constructively in-
voluntary actions in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. For
Locke, voluntariness contrasted with lack of control, not necessity
or duress. After all, "a waking man... necess[arily has] some ideas
constantly in his mind," and can move from one thought to another
of his own volition. 213 Volition, in turn, "is an act of the mind know-
ingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of
the man,"214 which can be done in a state of pure freedom, but also
out of necessity or "compulsion." 215 So, if you stand at a cliff and an
assailant holds a gun to your child's head, threatening to shoot him
unless you jump, your act of taking control of your legs and jump-
ing off the cliff to save your child is a volitional act, even though
you acted under duress. Volition is not the enemy of necessity,
freedom is: "the act of volition, or preferring one of ... two [op-
tions], being that which he cannot avoid, a man, in respect of that
act of willing, is under a necessity, and so cannot be free." 216 You
can stand at a cliff and be completely free to leap to your death be-
cause you have the "power to leap or not to leap." But if some
greater force prevents you from jumping or pushes you off, you are
no longer free "because the doing or forbearance of that particular
action is no longer in" your power.217 There are, therefore, volun-
tary actions - those that are free; involuntary actions - those that are
unfree; and, constructively involuntary actions - those that are voli-
213 JoiN LOcKE, ESSAY ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 318 (Alexander Campbell ed.,
1894), available at http://callistol0.ggimg.com/doc/LTNK/LTNK-19001397601-
i251-500.pdf.
214 Id. at 320.
215 Id. at 319.
216 Id. at 326.
217 Id. at 329.
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tional, but done out of necessity. This triad offers a generalized
means of describing most Internet users, which contradicts the im-
age of the free online anonym yet again.
Those of us who voluntarily create an Internet presence are
likely the most wired. We use Facebook because it is fun and a great
way to stay in touch with friends old and new. We use Twitter. 218
And we pay all our bills online even though we could easily write
checks. We go online freely, hoping to reap efficiency, connectivity,
and economic rewards in the process, but not because we must go
online for any particular reason. In contrast to these users are those
who are online involuntarily. They are probably a shrinking
breed,219 but they still represent a significant portion of the online
world. They want little to do with the Internet, never use email and,
if they own mobile phones, use them strictly for cellular calls. An
Internet presence is created for them, say, by employers who up-
load pictures of their employees onto their company websites or by
friends who posts pictures of them on Facebook even though they
are not members. In this way, their names and pictures are out
there, available online for others to see, even though they had no
control over the situation.
Between these two extremes likely fall most Internet users,
many of whom are constructively involuntary virtual selves. For
Locke, like in other legal contexts, constructively involuntary ac-
218 A next step in the empirical research of my dissertation will analyze the social
network overlap of Facebook and Twitter users, in addition to other online social
networks.
219 More than 81 percent of adults had some Internet presence as of December
2010, and that number has been increasingly dramatically over the past five years.
Demographics of Internet Users, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,
http://pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Whos-Online.aspx (last visited Mar. 3,
2013 5:06PM).
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tions are those that involve human volition, like jumping off a
cliff, 20 or resigning from a job out of necessity, for example, in re-
sponse to a threat against your child or an intolerably hostile work-
ing environment. 221 These are the users who must join the online
world lest they be left behind their peers and the rest of the world.
Online banking may be essential for productivity; an Internet con-
nection may be essential to do research for a school project; all your
friends may be online, pressuring you to join as well. If everyone
joined Facebook or Google+ and you remained offline, you would
miss essential social interaction with your peers. 222 In fact, even
those of us who are online completely voluntarily - if that is even
possible - have little control over how our online presence is used.
Examples of that lack of control can vary from the innocuous - a
friend forwarding a digital picture and an email address to a poten-
tial paramour - to the harassing - a peer doctoring a photograph of
220 LOCKE, supra note 213, at 329.
221 In the Title VII context, for example, an employee can be "constructively dis-
charged," or forced to resign because of intolerable or illegal hostile working condi-
tions. In Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan Association, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.
1975), the court laid out the original definition of constructive discharge -namely,
that "if the employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intol-
erable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation, then the employer
has encompassed a constructive discharge." Id. at 144. In Yates v. Avco, 819 F.2d 630
(6th Cir. 1987), the court defined constructive discharge as occurring when "working
conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the
employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign. Id. at 637. Constructivity in
this context is similar to Locke's volition-with-necessity conception of a man's power
to act: the employee makes her own decision to resign, but she does so out of necessi-
ty, making her act unfree.
222 I am currently analyzing survey data from approximately 2100 high school and
college students in the New York City area that should prove the necessity of a digi-
tal social networking presence and, perhaps, a mobile digital social networking pres-
ence. The results will be published in my doctoral dissertation.
Durkheim's Internet
you and sending it to every Facebook member, making threats on
your blog or publishing your address on a public board and invit-
ing readers to find you and rape you.22
This involuntary and constructively involuntary nature of
many of our Internet selves not only damages the myth of the
online anonym as a free agent of choice, but also implies that the
kind of Internet regulatory regime we would want should differ
from the online libertarian model that, among other things, eviscer-
ates our privacy rights upon constructively involuntary disclosures
to banks, ISPs, and other online intermediaries. Recall that free
choice is the shibboleth of assumption of risk and the third party
doctrine. 224 But personal data disclosures to ISPs are mandatory
conditions of Internet access and Internet access is a mandatory
condition of modern life. In this context, free choice is a fantasy.
4. A Universal Self
As digital interaction becomes more important in our daily
lives, there are fewer Americans without a virtual presence than
ever before. This fact mirrors Durkheim's model of society as essen-
tial to an individual's meaning and happiness in life. 22 The same is
true of the virtual world. Given the pervasiveness of the Internet
today and the essential function it plays in modern social interac-
tion, it is becoming increasingly impossible for any of us to deny the
need for a virtual presence. Social networking technologies are re-
m Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 64-65 (telling the story of Kathy Sier-
ra and other women attacked by online mobs).
224 See supra II.C.2.
2 See supra notes 128-1 and accompanying text.
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placing bars as "places" of social interaction 226 and blogs and news-
feeds are replacing newspapers227 According to one estimate, 1 in 5
romantic relationships already begin online. 228 Approximately 9 in
10 Americans ages 18-29 already see the Internet as an essential dai-
ly tool.229 Nearly 54 percent of Americans over the age of 65 are
online, joining almost everyone (98 percent) making more than
$75,000 in annual income2 30 And nearly half of adults (47 percent),
or 59 percent of Internet users, say they use at least one social net-
working tool.231 This is nearly double the 26 percent of adults who
used a social networking site in 2008. According to the Pew Internet
& American Life Project of the Pew Research Center, "this means
the average age of adult-[social networking site] users has shifted
from 33 in 2008 to 38 in 2010. Over half of all adult... users are now
226 See, e.g., June Thomas, The Gay Bar: Can It Survive, SLATE (July 1, 2011)
http://www.slate.com/id/2297609.
227 Joseph Plambeck, Newspaper Circulation Falls Nearly 9%, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 26,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/business/media/27audit.html; John
A. Byrne, The Changing Truths of Journalism, NIEMAN WATCHDOG (Dec. 21, 2008),
http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=showcase.view&showcas
eid=100.
228 Match.com and Chadwick Martin Bailey 2009-2010 Studies: Recent Trends:
Online Dating, http://cp.match.com/cppp/media/CMBStudy.pdf (last visited
Apr. 16, 2013 12:33PM).
229 Demographics of Internet Users, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,
http://pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Whos-Online.aspx (last visited Mar. 3,
2013 5:06PM).
230 Id.
231 Trend Data (Adults), PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,
http://pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Online-Activites-Total.aspx (last visit-
ed Mar. 3, 2013 5:13PM).
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over the age of 35. Some 56 percent of [social networking site] users
now are female."2
32
This trend toward universality has been accompanied by inte-
gration of the virtual world into our identities. Like Durkheim's
society, which provided an essential space for community and me-
diating our experiences, the modern Internet is a place for social
interaction, community, and political engagement. Pew found that
social networking site users get more emotional support and com-
panionship than those not using Facebook, Google+, or other simi-
lar sites.233 They are more politically engaged, using their social
networks for political causes, to galvanize allies, and to discuss cur-
rent political affairs. 23 In a sense, then, social networking sites have
become outgrowths of our physical social spaces, channeling our
social needs and linking us with those around us, not simply be-
cause Facebook seems like the fun thing to do, but because it pro-
vides an essential function in our social, professional and political
lives.
III. WHAT KIND OF INTERNET SOCIETY DO WE WANT?
The goal of this Article is to not only argue that the law's con-
ception of the virtual self is wrong - it ignores the essential link be-
tween our physical and online lives, our desire for community, and
the salience of virtual social interaction in obtaining that communi-
ty - but also to show how the myth of online anonym has contrib-
uted to a lawless ethos on the Internet. But if I am correct that the
232 Keith N. Hampton et al., Social Networking Sites and Our Lives,
PEWINTERNET.ORG 3 (2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/-/media/Files/Re
ports/2011/PIP%20-%20Social%20networking%20sites %20and %20our%201ives.pdf.
233 Id. at 4, 5.
234 Id. at 4-5.
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virtual self is public, mediated, involuntary, and universal, like
Durkheim's sociological conception of the individual, then Internet
society and the legal regimes that frame it should look quite differ-
ent than they do today. In short, if the virtual self is bound up with
and dependent on the online community for essential social, profes-
sional, and political purposes, then the ethos and goal of Internet
social norms and regulatory law should be to effectuate "digital
citizenship," not personal autonomy. Durkheim would expect social
norms to exert pressure on bad actors by having websites limit ano-
nymity and require users to invest in their online reputations. He
would want our social networks to be integrated places of safety,
where everyone can participate in the network and both users and
website operators are working toward the common good. In a
sense, then, the Internet is a modern realization of Durkheim's soci-
ety, essential for human interaction and capable of playing a salient
role in forming good digital - and, for that matter, physical - citi-
zens. Where Durkheim's individual acted responsibly because of
the solidarity he felt with others in society,235 law, intermediaries,
and individuals should work together to realize our need for com-
munity.
The legal case studies discussed in this Article, including identi-
ty-based online harassment and the lack of recognition of online
privacy interests, are anathema to this robust concept of digital citi-
zenship. Harassment conveys the message that the victims are
members of a "group in the community [that are] not worthy of
equal citizenship," thus depriving them of "civic dignity." 236 It in-
235 DURKHEIM, Individuals and the Intellectuals, in EMILE DURKHEIM: ON MORALITY
AND SOCIETY, SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 173, at 55-56.
236 Citron and Norton, supra note 13, at 1450 (quoting Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and
Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1601, 1607 (2010)).
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flicts serious psychological injury on the victim. 237 It skews public
discourse by misrepresenting gay people to the society at large.2
38
And it causes discrimination. 239 A failure to respect online privacy
rights by seeing free choice where none really exists turns the ne-
cessities of online life into burdens, making the Internet an inhospi-
table place for the wide swaths of users who express "concern" or
"worry" about the availability of their personal data online. 240 Weak
privacy protections, therefore, disincentivize participation in online
social, professional, and consumer life. Together, these problems
foster the perception of online lawlessness and sense of hopeless-
ness about it. Fostering community online by reorienting speech
and privacy jurisprudence can go a long way toward ameliorating
the concerns engendered by a lawless Internet ethos.
A. THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN FOSTERING DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP
1. Recommendations for Online Speech Jurisprudence
Durkheim believed that law was both reflective and generative,
expressing social norms as well as pushing society to develop new
ones. 241 The same can be said of the laws that govern cyberspace. As
argued above, the ethos of lawlessness created by § 230 immunity
and cases like Reno v. ACLU teaches digital users that the only path
237 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMP. L. REV.
385, 387 (2012).
238 Citron and Norton, supra note 13, at 1451 (citing Charles Lawrence, If He Hol-
lers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 468 (1990)).
239 Id. (citing Richard Delgado and David Yun, The Neoconservative Case Against
Hate Speech Regulation - Lively, D'Souza, Gates, Carter, and the Toughlove Crowd, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1812 (1994)).
240
241 DURKHEIM, DoL, supra note 12, at 83-84.
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to decent conduct online our hope Internet intermediaries will
choose to self-regulate rather than be subject to tort suits. Instead,
changes to the law of speech can shape virtue and citizenship val-
ues online in at least three ways.
We can reject the autonomy-obsessed rhetoric of Reno and Ze-
ran. 242 In striking down the CDA in Reno and finding AOL immune
from suit for the offensive messages on its bulletin board in Zeran,
the federal judiciary based its holdings on an inaccurate conception
of the virtual self as alone, anonymous, free of encumbrances, and
wanting it that way. In Reno, the Internet user was an active agent
of choice whose control over his Internet experience allowed him to
block indecent content on his own, without need for government
interference. 243 "[U]sers seldom encounter[ed] such content acci-
dentally," the Court believed, and noted that "the odds [were] slim"
that someone would access explicit sites by accident. 2" And in Ze-
ran, the court immunized AOL because of the judiciary's singular
focus on online autonomy: the court stated that "Section 230 was
enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communi-
cation, and accordingly, to keep government interference in the
medium to a minimum,"245 ignoring § 230's other purpose to en-
courage users and intermediaries to work together to prevent inde-
cent content from reaching minors.
A conception of the virtual self that understands the salience of
online participation and the role social networking plays in com-
munity-building correlates with more republican free speech values
242 See supra part H.C.
243 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 864, 870 (1997).
244 Id. at 854.
245 Zeran v. America, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
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that are absent in Reno and other Internet speech cases. 24 6 These are
the values expressed by Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion
in Whitney v. California:
247
Those who won our independence believed that the final
end of the state was to make men free to develop their fac-
ulties; and that in its government the deliberative forces
should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both
as an end and a means. They believed liberty to be the se-
cret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.
They believed that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discov-
ery and spread of political truth; that without free speech
and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them,
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against
the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion
is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of American government.
248
Justice Brandeis's vision of free speech channeled Durkheim's soci-
ology and his respect for the salient relationship between man and
society. Speaking freely was not meant to be a right of autonomy
alone, a Kantian end in itself. Rather, it was meant to allow citizens
to "develop their faculties" by participating in and "deliberat[ing]"
about politics. Free speech, press, and association were meant to
246 Danielle Citron has argued that restraining cyberharassment comports with the
First Amendment value of autonomy. See Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 41, at
97-98.
247 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
248 Id. at 375.
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protect the vitality of the state, not provide cover for licentiousness.
In Brandeis's view, like Durkheim's, public discussion and political
involvement are important to a functioning democracy and essen-
tial jobs of a citizen.
Cass Sunstein may be the most prominent scholar and advocate
for this vision of the First Amendment, and it is one that comports
with my vision for Durkheimian digital citizenship. Sunstein sees
Brandeis's view of the First Amendment through Madisonian eyes,
focused on the "right of freely examining public characters and
measures, and of free communication among the people." 249 Madi-
son "place[d] a high premium on political (not economic) equality
and on the deliberative functions of politics," 250 so free expression
was meant to foster democratic governance, participation, and co-
operation. For Sunstein, then, free speech is the means through
which we express "a certain conception of democratic government,
one that promotes political discussion." 25 1 Its "overriding goal" is
not an expression of individual autonomy detached from his politi-
cal context; rather, it "is to allow judgments to emerge through gen-
eral discussion and debate." 2 2 On this view, deliberative politics is
prior to the individual right to free speech in that the right to speak
serves a uniquely salient purpose in government. As a corollary,
Sunstein would argue that current free speech jurisprudence and its
Kantian and Rawlsian foundations are doing damage to the First
249 CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH xvii (1993)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY]. See also James Madison, Report of 1800, (Jan. 7,
1800), in Papers of James Madison 341 (David Matern et al., eds. 1991). For a broader
discussion of Professor Sunstein's Madisonian First Amendment vision, see
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY at 93-121.
25o SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY at xvii.
251 Id. at 27-28 (discussing Justice Brandeis' civic conception of speech).
252 Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 314 (1992).
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Amendment by flattening it, depriving it of meaning, and equating
obscene 253 and hateful 254 speech with deliberative political discus-
sion.
Applying this vision of the First Amendment to Reno may not
have changed the result; the Court held that the CDA was vague
and overbroad 255 regardless of the conception of the virtual self im-
plicit in its decision. But, had these values been as prominent in free
speech discourse as individual autonomy, the court in Zeran may
not have been so quick to dismiss Congress's hope that § 230 would
encourage online cooperation to shield children from indecent con-
duct.
In addition to elevating republican free speech values into First
Amendment discourse, two concrete reforms would move us to-
ward creating an Internet legal regime that fosters digital citizen-
ship by restricting online hate and harassment and sends a message
that such speech is no longer part of the ethos of the virtual world.
Danielle Citron has argued online hate and harassment on women,
minorities, and other vulnerable groups should be seen as civil
rights violations because of their devastating effects and attendant
community and societal harms and also because of the expressive
power of civil rights suits in condemning deviant online behav-
ior.256 A civil rights agenda for cyberhate would foster digital citi-
zenship because it would highlight communal harms and dangers
to Internet society as a whole rather than focusing exclusively on
the pain of an individual victim. 257 It would also empower the vir-
2- See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
254 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
255 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870-73, 877 (1997).
z5 See generally Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009).
257 Id. at 85-95.
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tual selves of previously victimized groups, allowing them access to
the online world and letting them actively participate in essential
social, professional, and political communities online.258 And a civil
rights agenda would help end an ethos of lawlessness on the Inter-
net by reminding harassers that § 230 immunity would not be abso-
lute and that there can be little safety behind a cloak of anonymity.
We can also expand our vision of harassment to encompass the
virtual world. As I have argued in the public school context, 259 and
as Mary Anne Franks has argued in the workplace context,260 har-
assment in the physical world can extend to harassment in the vir-
tual world, and vice versa, forcing victims into hostile environments
wherever they go. Therefore, when determining the extent of a hos-
tile environment caused by harassment, courts should consider
peer-to-peer cyberharassment as an extension of harassment be-
tween the same parties in the physical world. By clinging to the op-
posite view, that a school's authority to discipline harassers extends
only as far as the schoolyard and a workplace's hostile sexual envi-
ronment extends only as far as the four walls of the office, we not
only ignore the reality of how our virtual selves are inexorably
bound up with our physical selves, but also send the message that
what happens online is somehow less important, someone else's
problem or, worse yet, not even real. Like a civil rights agenda for
online hate, recognizing that online hostile environments caused by
cyberharassment can have deleterious effects on victims' participa-
tion, sense of self-worth, and dignity will allow the law to foster
digital citizenship online.
z5 Id. at 101-106.
259 See Waldman, Hostile Educational Environments, supra note 11.
260 See Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. (2012).
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2. Recommendations for Online Privacy Jurisprudence
The perceived lack of privacy online redoubles the image of
online lawlessness. Therefore, getting rid of the third party doctrine
- admittedly, just one weed in an overgrown field - is a necessary
first step toward bringing the law of the Internet in line with Durk-
heimian social space it occupies. The third party doctrine makes
little sense in the offline world. As Susan Brenner and Leo Clarke
argue, it assumes that a "disclosure to a trusted, reputable [third
party] is the same as indiscriminate disclosure to the public,"
where, in fact, the two disclosures are not fungible. Sharing infor-
mation with certain small groups or third parties are "controlled
disclosures," or limited sharing for a particular purpose.261 To as-
sume that those disclosures are based on the same decision-making
processes as public disclosures on Facebook or YouTube is absurd.
The increasing role played by Internet and digital technologies
makes this problem worse. As Dan Solove has noted, the third par-
ty doctrine will eviscerate all Fourth Amendment protections as
online intermediaries hold more personal information.
262
This Article shows that the Durkheimian nature of the Internet
makes the foundations of the third party doctrine - free choice and
assumption of risk - mere fantasies. Personal data disclosures to
ISPs, online banking platforms, social networks, and other private
online intermediaries are mandatory conditions of participation in
online life; the notion of free choice in this context is absurd as well.
261 Susan W. Brenner and Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared
Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & Pol'y 211, 258 (2006).
262 
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY
AND SECURITY 13 (2011).
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Therefore, the third party doctrine threatens privacy on the basis of
a liberal ideal of free and voluntary choice in a world where that
kind of choice often does not exist.
B. THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES
Durkheim believed that society makes us better. The same can
be true of the virtual self, who can learn to be a good digital citizen
by learning from social norms on the Internet. Danielle Citron and
Helen Norton propose a host of steps for private intermediaries to
take to help foster digital citizenship. 263 Rather than repeating many
of those helpful strategies here, I would like to critique or supple-
ment some of them and show how certain strategies comport with
the more robust vision of the virtual self.
Removing hateful content is one thing, but countering it with
responsive speech and user education may be more effective. Pro-
fessors Citron and Norton tell the story of Google's response to a
2004 incident where the first result on a Google search for "jew"
was the rabidly anti-Semitic website jewwatch.com. 26 While Google
did not change its algorithm to remove the site from its search re-
sults, it added its own link to the page where jewwatch.com ap-
peared, explaining that the site might be offensive, that Google did
not endorse the view and that users could click a hyperlink to visit
the homepage of the Anti-Defamation League. 265 This strategy does
not so much as enforce positive social norms as remind users that
there is other content out there. It also permits the hateful speech to
remain at the top of Google's search results, thus contributing to the
263 Citron and Norton, supra note 13, at 1468-84.
2 Id. at 1471-84.
265 Id. at 1472-73.
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permanence of online defamation. It also accepts that the best re-
sponse to bad speech is more speech, which is decidedly libertarian
in perspective and does little to ameliorate the harm. It creates a
shouting match between hateful and tolerant speech, which is es-
sentially no different than what exists online today. 266
Simply adding more speech does less to instill social norms in
users than Professors Citron's and Norton's transparency princi-
ple. 267 They argue that intermediaries should be clear about the
harms that their policies against hate speech seek to address and, by
explaining why hate speech is anathematic to their comer of the
online world, they can "make behavioral expectations more under-
standable."268 Websites should not just state that they do not toler-
ate hate or harassment, but explicitly define those terms in their
Terms of Service (TOS).269 To do this, Professors Citron and Norton
provide a basis for intermediaries to define cyberhate - namely, as
that which threatens or incites violence, intentionally inflicts severe
emotional distress, harasses, silences speech, and exacerbates hatred
or prejudice by denigrating an entire group. 270 The principles of
safety described in the TOS should also be highlighted, not discard-
ed after the user's first visit, by repeated reminders and intermedi-
ary requests that users join them in identifying hateful content. This
kind of education teaches users what behavior is acceptable in this
266 Nancy Kim gives a thorough explanation of the weakness of the "more speech"
response. See Nancy Kim, Website Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 UTAH L.
REV. 993, 1052-54 (2009).
267 Citron and Norton, supra note 13, at 1457-59.
268 Id. at 1457.
269 Id. at 1458.
270 Id. at 1438-39.
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online community, thus allowing them to learn by doing in the Ar-
istotelian sense.
To a similar end, intermediaries should discourage anonymity
and encourage users to invest in their online reputations. The
strongest antidote to deviant behavior in this area is the require-
ment to use real names, as is the case on Facebook. In order to sign
up for Facebook, you have to provide your full name and email ad-
dress and your full name follows you wherever you go. Unlike oth-
er social networking sites like MySpace, Facebook has no screen
names; your online identity is your physical identity.271 Real name
registration and the display of your real name links your online ex-
perience to your physical identity by putting your physical reputa-
tion at risk from online misbehavior. To be sure, Facebook users
could still concoct fake names and sign in with one of any number
of email accounts that hide their true identities, 272 but Facebook has
created its own social norms that make doing so difficult. Facebook
users have grown to expect that those they meet online will have
posted on their walls and on their friends' walls, have several if not
hundreds of pictures of them with their friends, have hundreds if
not thousands of friends and, with any likelihood, have mutual
271 On Facebook, there is "no pseudonymous role-playing, as in so many other
online social networks." Richard A. Posner, Just Friends, NEW REPUBLIC (July 21,
2010), http:/ /www.newrepublic.com/article/books-and-arts/magazine/76433/face
book-privacy-mark-zuckerberg# (reviewing DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK
EFFECT: THE INSIDER STORY OF THE COMPANY THAT IS CONNECTING THE WORLD
(2010)).
272 For example, my email address includes my name, Ari Waldman, but Google
does not prevent me from creating an email address like asdfghjkl@gmail.com that
hides my identity. Still, when you create additional email accounts, you are asked to
input another email address in case you lose your password or forget your user
name. Maintaining anonymity in this context becomes a full-time affair, almost as
complicated as creating shell corporations to launder money.
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friendships that link them to strangers. It would take considerable
effort for a fake profile of a fake identity to exist in this environ-
ment, especially when users are suspicious of others who do not
conform to Facebook's norm of sociability. Facebook's real name
requirement and its attendant social norms inhibit hateful and de-
viant behavior by creating unavoidable accountability - we are
linked to our physical identities, so any misbehavior leaves a deep
footprint on our online and physical identities. For example, if I
wanted to post the remark, "All Faggots Must Die," on a colleague's
or classmate's wall or as my updated status, that statement goes
directly into the site's "mini-feed" that can be seen by my friends,
the recipient's friends, and, depending upon our privacy settings,
anyone in our networks. Not only will my target know who at-
tacked him, but thousands of others will as well. It is akin to com-
mitting a crime in broad daylight.
Real names are not the only means to enforce the norms that go
along with being a public, non-anonymous self. Intermediaries can
require additional disclosures as part of a sign-in page before a user
is able to access an online community, thus encouraging voluntary
surrender of anonymity. Facebook requires a real name, an email
address, gender identification, and a birthday. 273 Yelp requires the
same information in addition to a zip code, presumably so it can
tailor your experience to your geographic location.274 And eBay re-
273 See Welcome to Facebook - Log In, Sign Up or Learn More, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/index.php?lh=fe006e54543718d427e630f76abee890&eu
=Bo4JjjxP8sjKOWyCx-qE4A (last visited Mar. 3, 2013 4:48PM).
274 See Sign Up, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/signup (last visited Apr. 9, 2013
7:24PM).
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quires a full mailing address, as well.275 These additional pieces of
information add additional checks on online misbehavior.
Underlying the effectiveness of real-name use and registration
and other opt-in disclosures is the effect such requirements have on
the user's online and physical reputations. That is, we create and
foster good behavior by putting users' skin in the game, by putting
our reputations out there for people to see and by allowing other
users to measure our virtuousness. Facebook does this implicitly -
by creating a world in which you are supposed to use your real
name, use a clear face picture, have large circles of friends, post pic-
tures, and regularly interact with your online acquaintances, any-
one who deviates from the norm is considered suspect. Sites like
eBay and Wikipedia do this explicitly, creating reputation systems
among users that encourage them to take care of their online identi-
ties. On eBay, users are encouraged to rate each other after each
transaction by selecting a rating (Positive, Neutral or Negative) and
leaving comments ("Prompt shipment, item as advertised. I rec-
ommend this seller. A+").276 The rating then follows the user wher-
ever he goes, displayed next to the user's screen name in bold, hy-
perlinked numbers to allow any other user to review previous rat-
ings and comments. In an online community that permits pseudo-
nyms, eBay has nevertheless created and enforced social norms.
Negative reviews are a form of social control, warning others to
stay away, and comments are accessible to anyone, allowing them
to understand the reasons for the reviews and creating a sense of
trustworthiness among users. Wikipedia also has a form of reputa-
275 See Hi! Ready to register with eBay?, EBAY, https://scgi.ebay.com/ws/eBay
ISAPI.dlI? RegisterEnterlnfo (last visited Mar. 3, 2013 4:50 PM).
276 Actual review taken from an eBay's user's review of me.
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tion ranking, though far more subtle. Users can acquire administra-
tive privileges in Wikipedia, which allows them to lock entries to
prevent misbehavior and stop vandalism, by proving their worth:
only when a user makes "lots of edits" can he "apply[] for an ad-
ministratorship." 277 He has to show the Wikipedia authorities that
he will use his newfound authority for good, in consort with the
common ethos of Wikipedia's original editors.
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Such rating systems are not without problems. They can create
barriers to entry for new users who, by definition, have no ratings,
and have the potential to be misused out of spite. But neither draw-
back has materialized in any significant way on eBay or Wikipedia.
Instead, the social norms created by these systems have turned eBay
and Facebook into villages, where people know quite a bit about
each other. That accountability should keep misbehavior in check
and reinforce the norms of conduct expected in those communities.
And it reflects precisely the kind of society that would be asso-
ciated with the robust conception of the virtual self. If the virtual
self is public, or not anonymous; mediated, or subject to intermedi-
aries; and often involuntary, or required to be a part of the online
world, then he would want a society focused on allowing him to
realize his digital personhood in that community. He would not be
obsessed with individual autonomy. After all, true user autonomy
cannot exist online. Rather, the virtual self's need to participate
online would suggest that the focus of Internet speech law and In-
ternet social norms should be on fostering user participation and
access rather than autonomy. And creating a place where everyone
277 
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feels safe and capable of participating means cooperating to create
good digital citizens and to stamp out online hate and harassment.
These are classic Durkheimian values, updated to reflect our digital
world.
CONCLUSION
Who we are online - or, what I have called the "virtual self" - is
quite different from who our laws and Internet intermediaries think
we are. Much of our online speech and privacy jurisprudence pre-
sume a conception of the self that is Kantian or Rawlsian: he is the
myth of the online anonym, a completely autonomous agent of free
choice. What is more, our error is not esoteric; our belief in the myth
is at the foundation of a neutrality-obsessed Internet speech regime
and a series of cases that eviscerate privacy interests on the basis of
the fantastic assumption of pure free choice. And by absolving eve-
ryone of responsibility, our laws have created an online ethos that
anything goes and that there is nothing protecting us when we, as
we must, venture online.
This Article proposes a new way of thinking about the virtual
world, one that reflects a more accurate vision of the virtual self as
public, mediated, and often involuntary. He is a modern Durkheim-
ian man, defined by his membership in digital society and imbued
with meaning as a member of that social space. To create this socie-
ty, we need a legal regime that balances free speech rights with oth-
er values, such as access, safety, and participation, and that recog-
nizes that privacy protections foster greater social interaction.
